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LICENSING LIES: MERGER CLAUSES, THE
PAROL EVIDENCE RULE AND PRE-
CONTRACTUAL MISREPRESENTATIONS
Kevin Davis1
Not even in the business world-that one area of social
life where the "battle of wits" competitive-game model
is most persuasive, and people match the shrewdness of
their judgments and the cleverness of their stratagems
for getting the better of one another-not even here do
rivals voluntarily assume the risk that the other party to
an agreement is an outright liar, getting the better of one
by plain deceit. 2
I. INTRODUCTION
Many judges and scholars seem to consider the rules assigning
liability for fraud-and sometimes even negligence-in contract
formation to be among the few mandatory rules of the contracting game.
This belief persists in spite of the fact that virtually every other rule of
contract law is treated as a default rule, and therefore, subject to
modification by agreement of the parties. Disclaimers of liability for pre-
contractual misrepresentations are common features of all kinds of
contracts, ranging from the complex agreements of purchase and sale
used in connection with the acquisition of businesses, to contracts for the
sale or the lease of consumer goods. However, consistent with the view
that the rules against fraud and negligence are mandatory rules, a
number of courts have refused to give effect to these kinds of disclaimers
in cases involving allegations of fraud or negligent misrepresentation,
even when they are contained in contracts between relatively
sophisticated parties.
'Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto. I wish to thank Bernard Black,
Bruce Chapman, GuyLaine Charles, David Chamy, Lara Friedlander, Victor Goldberg, Jeff
Gordon and Gillian Hadfield, as well as members of the Faculty of Law, University of
Toronto to whom an earlier draft of this paper was presented, for their helpful comments. I
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The leading case of Bates v. Southgate provides a classic
demonstration of this belief.3 Bates, a stock broker, sued the partners of
Southgate, another brokerage firm, alleging that one partner had
induced him to buy shares of a gypsum company by falsely representing
during a telephone conversation that the company had received a large
and potentially lucrative order. Bates sought to recover the purchase
price of the shares. The defendants admitted that any such
representation would have been false, but denied making it. They also
resisted the suit on the grounds that Bates was bound by a confirmation
slip issued by Southgate which stated "in making this transaction, we
make no representation other than to identify the security and state the
price." The evidence strongly supported the defendants' contention that
the parties' final agreement was embodied in the confirmation slip rather
than in their prior oral conversations. The plaintiff testified that, based
on his practice with his own customers, he understood that he was
entitled to call the deal off until shortly after he received the
confirmation slip, but if he failed to do so, the deal would go through on
the terms set out in the slip. After he received the slip, he "elected to go
through, well knowing that the terms were that Southgate was making
no representation with respect to this transaction other than to identify
the security and state the price." 4
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts dismissed the appeal
from a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. Justice Qua, writing for the court
held,
the same public policy that in general sanctions the
avoidance of a promise obtained by deceit strikes down
all attempts to circumvent that policy by means of
contractual devices.... To refuse relief would result in
opening the door to a multitude of frauds and in
thwarting the general policy of the law.5
The main goal of this paper is to attempt to identify the public
policy that formed the basis of Justice Qua's decision. There are both
practical and theoretical reasons for undertaking this project. The
practical reason is that this topic generates a significant amount of
litigation but has not recently been the object of much academic
3 31 N.E.2d 551 (Mass. 1941)
4 Id. It is not dear who the court was quoting at this point.
5 Id. at 558.
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commentary. 6 This article will serve to identify principles that might
eventually be used to clarify the law. This is potentially useful because
the relevant legal rules are so fundamental that they affect an
extraordinarily wide range of transactions. Even if we focus on
relatively sophisticated parties, the legal rules discussed here affect
transactions ranging from the modem-day equivalents of the securities
trade discussed in Bates v. Southgate to sales of agricultural equipment,
franchising agreements, and multi-million dollar mergers and
acquisitions.
The theoretical reason for addressing this topic is to provide insight
into the values that are implicit in the legal doctrines which govern
commercial activity. This is one of several areas of the law in which
those values appear to be in conflict. Conflicts between values such as
respect for individual autonomy, morality, and efficiency are familiar to
contract law scholars. 7 However, this article is one of the few that
emphasizes that when these conflicts arise in commercial settings the
parties have often contracted through agents rather than by bargaining
face-to-face. 8 This has both important moral and economic ramifications.
In fact, this article's main contribution is to show that once we take into
account the fact that most disclaimers of liability are actually disclaimers
of vicarious rather than primary liability, it becomes possible to
formulate a rule of enforceability which often, though not always,
reconciles principles of respect for individual autonomy, morality and
efficiency.
The article's more general contribution is to emphasize the lack of
congruence between the reality of modem contracting behavior, in
which transacting through agents is typical, and legal analyses, both
doctrinal and theoretical, which appear to be predicated on the
assumption that face-to-face bargaining is the norm. In fact, this article
6 For an overview of the topic, see JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE, 102-10 (4th ed. 1995). For less current discussions, see Justin Sweet,
Promissory Fraud and the Parol Evidence Rule, 49 CAL. L REV. 877 (1961); James L. Hartsfield,
Comment, The "Merger Clause" and the Parol Evidence Rule, 27 TEX. L. REV. 361 (1949);
Comment, Special Provisions in Contracts to Exclude Contentious Evidence Based on Parol
Evidence, 32 ILL. L. REV. 938 (1937-38).
7 See generally Michael Trebilcock, The Limits of Freedom of Contract (1993).
8 An exception is IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT 78-84 (1980). The
implications of delegation to agents in non-contractual settings have recently received
more attention. See Gary T. Schwartz, The Hidden And Fundamental Issue of Employer
Vicarious Liability, 69 S. CAL L. REV. 1739 (1996) and other articles in the same volume
(containing a Symposium on Corporate Tort Liability).
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can be regarded as a first step towards a more general examination of
how the legal rules that govern contracting should be reformulated to
distinguish more carefully between parties who have bargained face-to-
face and those who have not.
The discussion is organized as follows. Part II provides an overview
of the applicable legal doctrines. Part III describes the apparent conflict
between the will theory of contract law, which suggests that explicit
disclaimers of liability should be enforced, and theories which suggest
that contractual enforceability should depend on notions of morality or
economic efficiency and weigh against enforcement. Part IV discusses
recent attempts to justify enforcement of disclaimers of liability in
economic terms as a response to the facts that litigation is costly and can
sometimes be effectively replaced by non-legal sanctions.
This rather lengthy introduction to the current state of the literature
is designed to set the stage for the analysis in Part V. There I identify the
under-appreciated role that enforceable disclaimers of liability for pre-
contractual misrepresentations, whether fraudulent or not, might play in
minimizing agency costs. I also contend that permitting principals to
disclaim vicarious liability for their agents' misrepresentations is
compatible with conventional notions of morality. Part VI provides
illustrations of how this revised understanding can be used to resolve a
variety of archetypal disputes without contravening any of the values
that most people think are or should be embodied in contract law. I also
suggest that this revised understanding makes it easier to understand
the results of a number of decided cases. Part VII summarizes that
understanding in terms which should be useful to lawmakers. Part VIII
contains a brief conclusion.
H. DOCTRINAL OVERVIEW
Remedies for pre-contractual misrepresentations are provided by
the common law as well as under the Uniform Commercial Code
("UCC") and other legislation. 9 First of all, the common law permits a
person to avoid or seek the reformation of a contract which was
9 The discussion that follows does not consider either the circumstances in which a
misrepresentation may form the basis of a claim of estoppel or any rules peculiar to
circumstances in which a misrepresentation forms the basis of a defense rather than an
affirmative claim. In these regards, see WILLIAM L. PROSSER ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON
ON THE LAW OF ToRTS 730-35 (5th ed. 1984).
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concluded as a result of a misrepresentation. 10 Second, if the transaction
in question involves the sale of goods, the UCC permits the buyer to
bring an action for damages for breach of warranty." Third, the buyer
may bring an action in tort for damages for deceit or, in some
jurisdictions, negligent or innocent misrepresentation.1 2 Fourth, several
statutes, including the securities laws, also create causes of action for
misrepresentations. 13 These remedies are all usually available against a
person whether they make the misrepresentation personally or it is made
on their behalf by an agent.14
It is not uncommon for contracting parties to disclaim the right to
resort to any of these remedies. The courts commonly distinguish
between two types of clauses that might be construed as disclaimers of
liability for misrepresentations. The first type is known as an
"integration" or "merger" clause. A typical merger clause reads as
follows:
This writing contains the entire agreement between the
parties and there are no promises, understandings, or
agreements of any kind pertaining to this contract other
than stated herein.15
Many courts reason that the presence of a merger clause in a written
agreement simply indicates that the agreement in question is
"integrated". The parol evidence rule bars the use of extrinsic evidence
to contradict or even to supplement the terms of an integrated
10 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 164, 166 (1973). Note that on avoidance, the
buyer is entitled to restitution. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS §
4.15 (1990).
1 U.C.C. § 2-714 (1977). U.C.C. §§ 2-312, 313, 314 and 315 define the express and implied
warranties which may form the basis of a claim of breach of warranty.
12 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 525-557 (1977). PROSSER ET AL., supra
note 9.
13 See ALA. CODE §§ 6-5-100, 103 (1975); CAL CIV. CODE § 1709 (West 1998); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A: 32-1 (1987). See also 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1994).
14 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 257-259A (1958), providing that in the absence
of an exculpatory agreement a principal is liable for all misrepresentations made by an
agent so long as the misrepresentation is authorized, apparently authorized, within the
scope of the agent's power to act, or, in the case of an agent who has been authorized to
enter into negotiations, concerns matters that the principal might reasonably have expected
to be the subject of representations. The only exception to these general rules is that a
principal is not liable in tort for an agent's unauthorized misrepresentations where the
victim should have known that the agent acted without authority (although transactions
induced by such misrepresentations may still be rescinded by the victim).
15 FARNSWORTH, supra note 10, at 233.
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agreement. 16 Consequently, in the case of an integrated agreement the
parol evidence rule precludes the use of evidence of a misrepresentation
not contained in the final written agreement as a basis for rescission,
reformation, or an action for damages for breach of warranty. However,
most courts make an exception to the parol evidence rule to permit
evidence of fraud to be used by a party suing on a misrepresentation. 17
Some courts have gone even further and held that the parol evidence
rule is merely a rule of contract law that only bars actions that "sound in
contract", but cannot bar claims that sound in tort, even if they are based
upon nonfraudulent misrepresentations.18 Other courts arrive at similar
results by holding that clauses which attempt to exempt a party from
liability for fraudulent misrepresentations are contrary to public policy.19
Courts in some jurisdictions distinguish general merger clauses
from "specific" disclaimers of reliance upon certain representations and
permit the latter type of provision to bar claims for both fraudulent and
nonfraudulent misrepresentations. 20 Other courts only permit specific
disclaimers to bar claims for nonfraudulent rather than fraudulent
misrepresentations. 21 As might be expected, it is often difficult to
16 See REsTATEMENT (SEcOND) CoNTRACTs §§ 215, 216(1) (1973). The parol evidence rule is
codified in U.C.C. § 2-202 (1977).
17 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 10, at 216-19. But see One-O-One Enterprises, Inc. v. Caruso,
848 F.2d 1283 (D.C. 1988) (stating "[the exception for fraud] must not be stretched or
inflated in a way that would severely undermine the policy of the parol evidence rule,
which is grounded in the inherent reliability of a writing as opposed to the memories of
contracting parties").
Is See, e.g., Keller v. A. 0. Smith Harvestore Products, 819 P.2d 69 (Colo. 1991); Formento v.
Encanto Business Park, 744 P.2d 22 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987); City Dodge Inc. v. Gardner, 208
S.E.2d 794 (Ga. 1974). See generally Elizabeth Cumming, "Balancing the Buyer's Right to
Recover for Precontractual Misstatements and the Seller's Ability to Disclaim Express Warranties,"
76 MINN. L. REv. 1189 (1992). Some of these courts, however, have gone on to hold that the
presence of a merger clause is simply one factor that may be taken into consideration by
the finder of fact in determining whether the existence of all the elements of the tort, and in
particular the element of justifiable reliance, has been proven.
19 See, e.g., Pearson & Son v. Dublin Corp. (1907) A.C. 351 at 362 per Lord James of Hereford
(holding that "fraud vitiates every contract and every clause in it"); Wilkinson v.
Carpenter, 554 P.2d 512 (Or. 1976).
20 This approach is based upon the decision in Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris, 157 N.E.2d
597 (1959), which held that a party is barred from launching an action for fraudulent
misrepresentation if it has disclaimed reliance upon the specific type of representation on
which its suit is based.21 See, e.g., United States Welding, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 640 F. Supp. 350 (D. Colo. 1985).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 33, No. 2 [1999], Art. 3
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol33/iss2/3
1999] LICENSING LIES 491
determine whether a provision ought to be characterized as a specific
disclaimer of reliance rather than a general merger clause.22
To further complicate matters, some courts have held that a
disclaimer clause may exculpate a principal of his vicarious liability in
tort for the misrepresentations of an agent but does not prevent the
victim of the misrepresentation from rescinding the contract prior to a
change in position of the principal. The rationale behind this position is
that a principal should not benefit from the fraud of his agent.23
This last approach is endorsed by the frequently overlooked section
260 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency. However, that rule is subject
to some important qualifications. First of all it is subject to a caveat that
a principal may protect himself from even an action for rescission by a
"thoroughly understood agreement" made with a third party. The
Commentary does not explain how this caveat can be reconciled with the
stated rationale for the general rule. Second, both the general rule and
the caveat seem to be subject to the principle that only an innocent
principal can contract against liability for an agent's misrepresentation.
According to the Commentary, an innocent principal is one who has no
"knowledge 'of past frauds or expectation of future frauds by the
agent". 24 In fact, the principal must not even "desire" the agent to make
fraudulent statements.25 Furthermore, partners and officers or senior
managers of corporations are considered to represent the partnership or
the corporation as the case may be for the purposes of this rule and so an
exculpatory clause will have no effect upon the liability of the
partnership or corporation for the misrepresentations of such an
individual.26  Given all these qualifications of the relatively
straightforward general rule, it seems possible to reconcile virtually any
result with the Restatement.
This review of the provisions of the Restatement (Second) of Agency
brings to light a fact which may otherwise have been obscured by the
rather formalistic overview that preceded it: moral considerations have
significantly influenced the law in this area. This is clear from the
22 See Keller, 819 P.2d, at 71 (in which a contract stating "Buyer recognizes that [pre-
contractual statements] are not guarantees and he has not relied upon them as such" did
not specifically disclaim reliance on pre-contractual statements).
23 See Super-Cold Southwest Co. v. Willis, 219 S.W. 2d 144 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
24 Restatement (Second) of Agency § 260 cmt. a (1958).
2 Restatement (Second) of Agency § 260 cmt. b (1958).
26 Id.
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language of the Restatement of Agency as well as many of the decided
cases. 27 Not all theories of the basis of contractual obligation allow room
for moral values to play a role in determining the enforceability of a
contractual provision. The next section explores this insight in greater
detail, showing that this area of the law provides a useful testing ground
for competing conceptions of the basis of contractual obligation.
III. CONFLICTING VALUES
Legal scholars generally offer one of three types of justifications for
enforcing contractual obligations. First, some claim that contract law is
primarily designed to give effect to the will of individuals who choose to
make commitments to others. 28 A second view is that contract law
reflects a number of diverse values, of which respect for the will of the
parties is only one. According to this view, judges sometimes refuse to
give effect to the will of the parties to a contract in order to respect other
values such as the judges' own notions of justice and fairness in
exchange. 29 Finally, a third influential perspective on the basis of
contractual obligation emphasizes the economic function of contract law.
This view holds that the rules of contract law are designed to facilitate
the execution of Pareto-efficient exchanges.3° The question of whether it
is appropriate to enforce disclaimers of liability for pre-contractual
misrepresentations looks quite different when examined from each of
these perspectives.
A. Respect for Individual Autonomy
The will theory of contract law is premised on the notion that
contract law serves to increase individuals' freedom by giving them the
freedom to make binding commitments. It is also said that failing to
enforce a commitment that an individual intended to be legally binding
27 White and Summers suggest that merger clauses should not be enforced where the object
of the claim has a reputation for "shady dealing". After explaining their discomfort with
one court's decision to enforce a merger clause they say, "it helps to know that the Holland
Furnace Co. of the 1950's [the object of the claim] was notorious for its questionable sales
tactics." See WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 6, at 107.
The leading exponent of this view is Charles Fried. See generally CHARLES FRIED,
CONTRACr AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBUGATION (1981).
29 See Patrick S. Atiyah, The Modern Role of Contract Law, in ESSAYS ON CONTRACT 1 (1990).
See also Patrick S. Atiyah, Contracts, Promises and the Law of Obligations, in ESSAYS ON
CONTRACT 10 (1990); Patrick S. Atiyah, Contract and Fair Exchange, in ESSAYS ON CONTRACT
329 (Rev. ed. 1990).
30 See Anthony Kronman & Richard Posner, Introduction: Economic Theory and Contract Law,
in THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 1-10 (1979).
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would imply that we did not respect the individual's ability to make
autonomous choices.31  This implies that courts should enforce
disclaimers of liability for misrepresentations according to their terms so
long as they are certain that the agreement to disclaim liability was itself
an autonomous act. A disclaimer is simply another kind of
commitment-a commitment not to seek legal redress under certain
circumstances-that must be enforced in accordance with the will of the
parties in order to respect their autonomy.32
Yet no matter how committed one is to the principle that all
autonomous agreements should be enforced, it is difficult to avoid
harboring reservations about holding people to commitments that seem
to be clearly contrary to their best interests. This may explain why many
judges and legal scholars have reservations about enforcing disclaimers
of liability for fraudulent or, less commonly, negligent
misrepresentations. It is difficult to understand how anyone could ever
benefit from entering into such an agreement.33 Moreover, in many cases
it seems appropriate to presume that a misrepresentation that on its face
appears to be excluded by a merger clause was actually left out of the
final agreement inadvertently or because of the high cost of
incorporating it. Consequently, some might defend courts' instinctive
reluctance to enforce provisions that appear to relieve one party from
liability for a material pre-contractual misrepresentation on the ground
that parties rarely enter into such agreements voluntarily. They might
claim that prohibiting enforcement of agreements of this sort is prudent
in order to avoid the risk of mistakenly enforcing agreements that do not
reflect autonomous choices. 34
This mildly paternalistic reasoning suggests that in the absence of
clear language, courts interpreting contracts should presume that the
31 See FRIED, supra note 28, at 20.
32 See FRIED, supra note 28, at 38 (stating that "given the consensual basis of contract as
promise, the parties should in principle be free to exclude legal enforcement so long as this
is not a fraudulent device to trap the unwary"). See also SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL
CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 109-10, 138 (1979) (suggesting that even intentional
deception is morally acceptable if it has been consented to so long as the consent is
informed and voluntary).
33 See infra Part m.
34 See FEINBERG, supra note 2, at 124-27 (discussing the appropriateness of this kind of
presumption of non-voluntariness). For a stronger defense of paternalism in contract law,
see Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalistic Motives in Contract and Tort Law with
Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MARYLAND L. REV.
563 (1982).
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parties did not intend to disclaim liability for fraud or negligence. In
practice this would probably mean that 'boilerplate' merger clauses
would not be construed as disclaimers of liability for fraudulent or
negligent pre-contractual misrepresentations. However, an explicit
disclaimer of liability would be effective.
B. Morality
No one seems to debate that lying is almost always morally
indefensible. 35 This seems to explain why there is also relatively little
debate surrounding the proposition that fraud, which most people
equate with lying, is morally indefensible. Of course, in law fraud is
often defined more broadly than just lying. For instance, lying is
generally defined to mean intentional misrepresentation whereas fraud
is often defined to include misrepresentations that are made recklessly as
opposed to intentionally.36  Furthermore, the term fraud also
encompasses cases in which there has been no affirmative
misrepresentation at all, but instead the failure to disclose one or more
material facts.37 The moral status of these forms of deception is less clear
than that of lying. Nonetheless, it seems fair to say that fraud is
generally considered to be morally reprehensible. This is evidenced by
the fact that fraud is not only civilly actionable but also a criminal
offence.38
Some lawyers believe that contract law does and ought to reflect the
influence of a number of societal values, only one of which is the
principle of respect for exercises of individual autonomy. For judges this
approach opens up the possibility of overriding the will of the parties to
impose collective ideals of justice and faimess.39 Consequently, some
judges use it to justify overriding a party's prior expression of intent to
bind herself not to seek any remedy for a fraudulent misrepresentation.
Their reasoning is that contract law should express society's
disapprobation of the immoral, not to mention potentially criminal,
5 CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 54-78 (1978); see generally BOK, supra note 32. See also
Anthony Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 98 YALE L. J. 472, 486 (1980).
36 See McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190, 1197 (3d Cir. 1979); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman,
Dillon & Co. Inc., 570 F.2d 38, 44-46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978) (scienter
requirement under Rule 10b-5 may be satisfied by proof of recklessness).
37 For a discussion of such cases, see FRIED, supra note 28, at 78-85, and TREBILCOCK, supra
note 7, at 106-118.
38 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §1341 (1994) (mail fraud); 18 U.S.C. §1343 (1994) (wire fraud).
39 See, e.g., Atiyah, supra note 29; PATRICK DEvLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 43-60
(1965).
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behavior of the party seeking to rely upon the disclaimer.40 The purpose
of doing so seems to be either to make a moral statement or else to
ensure that contract law joins other branches of the law in attempting to
deter fraud. This reasoning clearly justifies allowing the victim of a
fraudulent misrepresentation to rescind an ensuing contract, but it may
not go so far as to support allowing the victim to maintain an action for
deceit.41
It is less clear whether taking a moralistic approach to contract law
justifies refusing to enforce disclaimers of liability for negligent
misrepresentations. The principle that people should be liable for the
consequences of their negligent behavior is a collective value that some
might argue should not be supplanted in favor of the principle of respect
for the individual autonomy, not even the autonomy of the victim of the
negligence.42 However, the amount of moral culpability associated with
negligence is debatable.43 This weighs against allowing victims of a
negligent misrepresentation to rescind any ensuing contract simply to
make a moral statement. It is even more difficult to justify allowing a
person who has voluntarily disclaimed their right to sue on a
4 0 See, e.g. Bates v. Southgate, 31 N.E.2d 551 (Mass. 1941).
41 The difficulty is that allowing a tort claim to be brought in these circumstances seems
incompatible with conventional notions of (corrective) justice that tend to be based upon
the notion of respect for individual autonomy. These theories suggest that the defendant
should be permitted to raise the defense of consent in these cases. See generally Kenneth W.
Simons, Assumption of Risk and Consent in the Law of Torts: A Theory of Full Preference, 67 B.U.
L. REV. 213 (1987). However, it may be possible to formulate a retributive justification for
imposing liability in tort in these circumstances. In retributive theory, intentional
wrongdoing, like fraud, is viewed as not just causing harm to particular victims but also to
society as a whole, because the wrongdoer has challenged the concept of right itself. This is
what justifies the use of criminal, state-imposed sanctions against the wrongdoer. It may
be possible to explain a rule allowing the victim of fraud to recover damages from the
guilty party, regardless of the fact of their consent to being defrauded, as a means by which
the state delegates responsibility for exacting retribution to the victim. See Bruce Chapman
& Michael J. Trebilcock, Punitive Damages: Divergence in Search of a Rationale, 40 ALA. L. REV.
741, 786-97 (1989) (suggesting the concept of delegation of the state's retributive functions).
Of course this presumes that consent does not negate the criminality of fraud. See Mark
Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REV. 591, 614-
16(1981).
42 Keller v. A. 0. Smith Harvestore Products, 819 P.2d 69, 73 (Colo. 1991) (holding that
manufacturers should not be shielded from liability for negligent misrepresentation claims
simply because they are not service or information providers).
43 Compare Jerome Hall, Negligent Behavior Should be Excluded from Penal Liability, 63 COLUM.
L. REV. 632,635-642 (1963) with H.LA. Hart, Negligence Mens Rea and Criminal Responsibility,
in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILrIY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW ch. 6 (1968) and
George P. Fletcher, The Theory of Criminal Negligence: A Comparative Analysis, 119 U. PA. L.
REV. 401 (1971).
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misrepresentation to nonetheless launch an action based on a negligent
misrepresentation. 44 This contradicts not only principles of contract law
but also the principle of respect for individual autonomy that forms the
basis of the tort law defenses of consent and voluntary assumption of
risk.45 On the other hand, there is less debate about the appropriateness
of characterizing someone who has been grossly negligent as
blameworthy. 46 This seems to correspond to a certain amount of judicial
reluctance to enforce disclaimers of liability for gross negligence.47
Finally, we should consider the case in which a disclaimer
effectively amounts to a retraction of a prior fraudulent
misrepresentation. From one perspective it seems wrong to hold a
person responsible for a misrepresentation that they explicitly retracted
before anyone had an opportunity to rely on it to their detriment. But, in
some cases that person can be compared to a terrorist who plants a bomb
in a busy subway station and then calls to warn people to avoid the area.
Suppose that someone negligently wanders into the station and is killed
when the bomb explodes. It certainly seems appropriate to hold the
terrorist responsible for the victim's death, despite his attempt to
mitigate the consequences of his wrongful action. On the other hand, if
the victim deliberately wandered into the station after being warned, it
would be inappropriate to hold the terrorist responsible.4 On balance,
the most satisfying approach seems to be to say that if a
misrepresentation has been retracted in the clearest possible language it
should not be considered to have induced entry into a subsequent
contract.
Some moralists might try to reconcile their position with the notion
that, in general, parties' autonomous agreements should be enforced.
For example, they might call attention to the fact that a commonly cited
reason for giving effect to autonomous contractual decisions is to
manifest the intrinsic value that we attach to exercises of individual
44 See supra note 41, for an explanation of why this is incompatible with the concept of
corrective justice. There is no retributive justification for allowing the suit because the
wrongdoer has not acted intentionally.
4See PROSSER ET AL., supra note 9, at 112, 482-84.
4 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE §2.02 (2)(d) (defining culpable negligence as a "gross
deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's
situation").47 See PROSSER ET AL., supra note 9, at 484.
48 Then his actions might qualify as a novus actus interveniens, sufficient to relieve the
terrorist of liability. See GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 365-66 (1978); see
also generally H.L.A. HART & ANTHONY HONOR, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (1959).
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autonomy in our society.49 Enforcing agreements that are the product of
fraud arguably diminishes the symbolic value of the law's general
prohibition on interfering with the exercise of private autonomy through
deception. This intuition can be translated into an ontological argument
that the use of law as an instrument of fraud is fundamentally
incompatible with the notion of law as the embodiment of right.
Alternatively, those who prefer a more instrumental mode of reasoning
might rely on the currently popular notion that law can and should
attempt to influence behavior by shaping attitudes as well as directly
sanctioning or rewarding certain behavior. On this view, condoning
fraud in any way may give the inappropriate impression that it is
somehow acceptable, thus weakening the psychological constraints that
operate to keep people from committing fraud (independently of any
fear of legal sanctions).s
On another tack, some people justify the will theory's respect for
exercises of individual autonomy on instrumental grounds, typically
because it is likely to facilitate welfare maximization.51 The moralist
might attempt to win these people over by arguing that it makes perfect
sense for courts to interfere with autonomous contracting decisions that
do not serve their instrumental goals.5 2 For instance, they might rely on
the economic analysis set out in the following section to prove that
agreements of this sort tend not to be mutually beneficial.
C. Economic Considerations
The central tenet of the economic approach to contract law is that
legal rules ought to be designed to encourage contracting parties to
engage in mutually beneficial exchanges. The standard economic
analysis of the law of misrepresentation implies that there is little
economic justification for enforcing disclaimers of liability for fraudulent
49 See, e.g., FRIED, supra note 35
5o For examples of recent scholarship in this vein, see Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social
Meaning and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349 (1997); Cass Sunstein, On The Expressive Function
of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996); and Richard Pildes, The Destruction of Social Capital,
144 U. PA. L. REv. 2055 (1996). The themes discussed in this literature bear considerable
resemblance to the views set out by Devlin, supra note 39.
51 See, e.g., Richard Posner, The Economics of Justice 48-115 (1981).
52 For an example of a forceful critique along these lines, see Robin West, Authority,
Autonomy and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral and Political Visions of Franz
Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L REV. 384 (1985). See generally TREBILcOcK, supra
note 7.
1999] 497
Davis: Licensing Lies: Merger Clauses, the Parol Evidence Rule and Pre-C
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1999
498 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33
or negligent misrepresentations.5,3 This can be illustrated with a simple
example.54 Suppose that Anne offers to sell Barbara a sealed box of
candy. Anne tells Barbara that there is no need for her to open the box
before she buys it, that Barbara should take her word for the fact that it
contains candy. Barbara knows that there is a possibility that Anne is
lying and that when she arrives home and opens the box she will
discover that the box only contains cat food. Would it ever be mutually
beneficial for the parties to let Anne disclaim liability for this kind of
intentional misrepresentation?
Leaving aside for a moment the influence of factors such as the
litigation costs and non-legal sanctions discussed in the next section, it is
difficult to understand how it could ever be particularly beneficial for
Anne and Barbara to agree to this disclaimer. If Anne is telling the truth,
it should cost her nothing to agree to assume liability for fraudulent
misrepresentations. 5 Therefore, if Anne disclaimed liability, Barbara
would have to assume that she was lying about the contents of the box
(there being no other reason for her to disclaim liability) and reduce the
price that she was willing to pay for it accordingly. So long as Barbara
reacts to the disclaimer this way, she will not be any worse off than if
53 For discussions of the economic justifications for imposing liability for fraud in the first
place, see GORDON TULLOCK, THE LOGIC OF THE LAW (1971); RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAw 122 (5th ed. 1997); Paul G. Mahoney, Precaution Costs and the Law of Fraud
in Impersonal Markets, 78 VA. L. REV. 623 (1992). For an economic analysis of negligent
misrepresentations, see William Bishop, Negligent Misrepresentation Through Economists'
Eyes, 96 LAw QUARTERLY REv. 360 (1980).
4 This example is based on one used in RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 99
(3-d ed. 1986).
m Economists typically assume that the main cost of avoiding misrepresentation is the cost
of verifying one's statements before making them. This in turn implies that so long as
scienter is an essential element of fraud and is defined as knowledge of the falsity of a
statement, it should be costless for a person to avoid making a fraudulent
misrepresentation. See, e.g., Mahoney, supra note 53, at 647. There are cases, however, in
which making an intentional misrepresentation is the only way for a party to avoid
disclosing valuable information. This may occur when a person is forced to respond to a
direct question or is compelled by law to disclose certain categories of information. Macey
and Miller have argued that in these cases it may be appropriate to relieve the party of
liability for fraud in order to preserve his incentives to acquire and make use of the
information. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics: An
Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1059 (1990). These are situations
in which the cost of being honest would appear to be equal to the value of the information
that would be lost by disclosure-a positive number. However, this does not seem likely to
affect the present analysis. Allowing firms to disclaim liability for fraud usually would not
enhance their ability to protect valuable information. A disclaimer would often simply
make it clear to all concerned that the party was lying. See Ian Ayres, Back to Basics:
Regulating How Corporations Speak to the Market, 77 VA. L. REv. 945,963 (1991).
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disclaimers of liability were unenforceable (in which case Anne would be
deterred from lying in the first place). At the same time though, making
the disclaimer enforceable does not seem to make the parties better off in
any way.
If this were the only consequence of permitting parties to disclaim
liability for fraud, economists would be indifferent about whether courts
enforced these kinds of disclaimers. However, once we introduce even a
slight possibility that Barbara will (perhaps unreasonably) trust Anne to
tell the truth even when she (Anne) is not legally bound to do so, it
becomes possible to build a case against enforcing these disclaimers.
Under these circumstances, if disclaimers of liability for fraud are
enforceable Anne might try to disclaim liability and then lie about the
contents of the box hoping that, notwithstanding the disclaimer, her lie
will induce Barbara to pay more for the box than she would in the
absence of the lie. In this case, the transaction between Anne and
Barbara might fail to meet the conditions for Pareto-superiority, because
Barbara might be made worse off by the transaction. She might be
induced to pay more for the box than she would ever be willing to pay
for a box of cat food.56 Perhaps even more significantly from an
economic perspective, this transaction may not simply redistribute
wealth from Barbara to Anne. It is quite possible that Anne's gain from
the transaction will be less than Barbara's loss, because Anne may incur
some costs in order to accomplish her deception. For example, she might
buy a label that says "candy" and stick it on the box.57 Economists view
these types of expenditures as being completely unproductive.5 8
Therefore, from an economic perspective it would be better if disclaimers
-% Specifically, it would then fail to satisfy the conditions of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. For a
discussion of different conceptions of efficiency, see JULEs J. COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS
AND THE LAW ch. 4 (1988).
5 7 This is not to say that otherwise Anne's gain would necessarily equal Barbara's loss. For
example, suppose that Barbara had to decide whether to spend five dollars on traveling to
Anne rather than another candy seller, money that will be wasted if the box does not have
any candy. In this case, Anne's fraud will cause Barbara to lose not only the difference
between the value to her of a box of candy and a box of cat food, but also the five dollars.
m The seminal article is Gordon Tullock, Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies and Theft, 5 W.
ECON. J. 224 (1967). The view that these activities have no social benefit may be difficult to
defend from a utilitarian perspective if the deceiver derives satisfaction from the act of
deception itself. Stigler suggests that the utility derived from such activities should not be
included in the social welfare function. See George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of
Laws, 78 J. POL ECON. 526, 527 (1970). Discussing an analogous challenge to the economic
analysis of the law of rape, Landes and Posner suggest that such cases will be rare and so
are not worth considering. See WILLIAM LANDES & RIcHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTRE OF TORT LAW 157-58 (1987).
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of liability for fraud were unenforceable, thus removing Anne's incentive
to invest resources in trying to deceive Barbara.
This analysis suggests why it may be desirable to have a legal rule
banning the enforcement of disclaimers of liability for fraudulent
misrepresentations. Such a rule does not make any contracting parties
worse off and at the same time helps to prevent unscrupulous people
from taking advantage of the ignorance or vulnerability of others. Such
unscrupulous behavior is not only morally reprehensible; it is also
undesirable from an economic perspective, because it involves
expenditure of resources on unproductive activities. Furthermore, if
successful, fraud may result in misallocation of resources (imagine the
case where Barbara does not own a cat). Note that this analysis suggests
that not only should a victim be able to rescind a contract induced by a
fraudulent misrepresentation, they should also be permitted to claim
whatever damages are necessary to deter fraud.
A similar but slightly weaker argument can be made against
enforcing disclaimers of liability for certain negligent misrepresentations.
Suppose that Anne honestly believed that the box contained candy
(based on what she was told by the manufacturer) but had not taken any
steps to verify her statement to Barbara that it did. Anne's failure to
verify her statement would clearly be negligent if the cost of verification
was lower than the cost to Barbara of bearing the risk of inaccuracy. It
would never make sense for the parties to agree to let Anne disclaim
liability for this sort of negligence. By hypothesis, it would always be
cheaper for Anne to verify her statements and then assume liability for
them than to disclaim liability and then offer to compensate Barbara for
bearing the risk of inaccuracy. This suggests that there is no economic
justification for enforcing disclaimers of liability for certain sorts of
negligent misrepresentations.5 9  However, unlike cases involving
fraudulent misrepresentations, permitting disclaimers of liability for
negligent misrepresentations seems unlikely to create any incentives to
59 This is not true of all negligent misrepresentations. The conventional definition of
negligence in American law merely requires that the cost of precautions be lower than the
expected value of the loss to be avoided. See U.S. v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173
(2d Cir. 1947). Thus it is possible in law for Anne to be negligent for failing to verify her
statement even if Barbara is better placed to bear the risk of loss, because she can simply
open the box. This is because the cost of precautions to Anne might still be lower than the
expected value of the loss that Barbara will incur if the box turns out to contain cat food. It
might actually be mutually beneficial to the parties for Anne to be able to disclaim liability
for this sort of negligence. Alternatively, Anne could be excused from liability on the
grounds that Barbara was contributionally negligent. I owe this point to Bruce Chapman.
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invest in deception (because any investments of this sort would probably
make the activity fraudulent rather than merely negligent).
Finally, from an economic perspective it is not clear whether it is
essential to allow Anne to escape liability if she retracts a prior
fraudulent misrepresentation. Some might argue that this is necessary to
give her an incentive to make a retraction. However, she should already
have an incentive to do this in order to reduce her potential liability for
fraud.
D. Summary
There are both moral and economic objections to enforcing
disclaimers of liability for either negligent or fraudulent pre-contractual
misrepresentations. Furthermore, the economic analysis set out above
suggests that even courts that favor the will theory of contract law
should hesitate to enforce disclaimers of liability for fraud or negligence,
because there is a good chance that they were not agreed to voluntarily.
These objections do not seem to apply, however, in cases where a party
has effectively retracted a prior misrepresentation.
IV. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
In the real world, the legal system does not operate nearly as
smoothly as it does in the world represented by economists' simplified
models. In actuality, litigation is unpredictable and expensive, and
mechanisms that have little do with the formal legal system can
sometimes be used to achieve the same goals achieved by that system.
Recent law and economics scholarship shows that when these features of
commercial reality are taken into account, it becomes easier to find an
economic justification for enforcing disclaimers of liability for pre-
contractual misrepresentations, including fraudulent and negligent
misrepresentations. 60
A. The Limitations of the Judicial Process
Early discussions of the parol evidence rule suggest that the rule
was developed to enable courts to avoid the difficult task of determining
whether an oral statement has been made.61 Whatever its merits as an
explanation for the historical development of the parol evidence rule,
60 See generally David Charny, Non-Legal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104
HARV. L. REv. 373 (1990).61 See also One-O-One Enterprises, Inc. v. Caruso, 848 F.2d 1283 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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this argument fails as a rationalization for the rule's current scope.
Evidentiary concerns only seem to explain why the courts enforce
disclaimers of liability for oral pre-contractual misrepresentations. These
concerns do not lead to the conclusion that the courts should enforce
disclaimers of liability for fraudulent and negligent misrepresentations
that are reduced to writing, because their existence should not be
particularly difficult to prove.62
There is a slightly different way of explaining, however, why the
inherent characteristics of litigation may make it worthwhile for parties
to disclaim liability for misrepresentations. If potential litigants always
behaved rationally and always agreed on the likely outcome of litigation,
they would rarely bother to take their cases to court. Instead, they
would tend to settle and avoid the costs of litigating. This does not
reflect reality though. For a variety of reasons, potential litigants often
disagree about the likely outcome of litigation. Typically, when this
happens both parties are relatively optimistic, meaning that each party
gives their own claim a greater chance of success than the other party
would give the same claim.63 This tends to reduce the likelihood of the
parties agreeing to settle their disputes before trial and thus avoid the
costs of litigation.64 Of course, the likelihood of settlement will also be
low if potential litigants prefer to litigate rather than settle even when
settlement makes sense from a purely financial perspective. It is not
uncommon for parties to insist on going to trial 'on principle' or because
they 'just want to have their day in court'. In either case, parties may
find it worthwhile to disclaim liability for even fraudulent
misrepresentations, because the benefits of assuming liability are
outweighed by the litigation costs that can be expected to accompany the
assumption of liability.
An independent reason why parties may find it useful to disclaim
liability for misrepresentations is because they might fear that courts are
62See FARNSWORTH, supra note 10, at 466-69.
6
3See Jeffery J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL L. REv. 113
(1997) (attributing this tendency to cognitive biases).
64 When this happens the amount that a rational defendant is willing to offer to settle the
dispute may be lower than the amount that a rational plaintiff is willing to accept as a
settlement, even after the parties take into account the costs of going to trial. See William
M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J. L. & ECON. 61 (1971); John P. Gould, The
Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279 (1973); Richard A. Posner, An Economic
Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973); Robert D.
Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution, 27 J.
ECON. LIT. 1067 (1987).
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unable to determine accurately whether parties have behaved
negligently or fraudulently. This can be problematic when combined
with the fact that punitive damages are often awarded to victims of
misrepresentations. This combination of factors makes it possible for
significant liability to be imposed upon parties who have not behaved
negligently in the economic sense, meaning that they have taken all cost-
justified precautions. This, in turn, gives the potentially liable party an
incentive to take what both parties would regard as excessive
precautions."
In some cases it might be mutually beneficial for parties to disclaim
liability for negligent misrepresentations in order to avoid creating
incentives to take wasteful precautions." However, it is less likely that
they will want to disclaim liability for fraudulent or grossly negligent
misrepresentations for this reason. It seems relatively unlikely that a
party whom a court considers, to have made a grossly negligent or
fraudulent misrepresentation will actually have taken adequate
precautions against making a misrepresentation. Therefore, it seems
unlikely that the threat of this sort of liability will create any significant
incentive for anyone to take wasteful precautions, even if we allow for
the effects of punitive damages and uncertainty about the precise
meanings of fraud or gross negligence. 67
B. Non-legal Sanctions
From an economic perspective, the main benefit associated with
imposing legal liability for misrepresentations is that the fear of liability
will give parties incentives to ensure the accuracy of their pre-
contractual representations. However, any non-legal sanctions that
accompany the making of a misrepresentation could have a similar
deterrent effect and may serve as a substitute for legal sanctions.68 This
65 See Chapman & Trebilcock, supra note 41; Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence
and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 279 (1986); John E. Calfee & Richard
Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance With Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965
(1984).
66 But see Charny, supra note 60, at 407-408 (discussing the opposite situation where legal
sanctions give parties insufficient incentives to take precautions).
67 In a similar vein, see Jason S. Johnston, Punitive Liability: A New Paradigm of Efficiency in
Tort Law, 87 COLUM. L. Rrv. 1385 (1987) (suggesting that over-deterrence can be eliminated
by making only gross negligence that is proven by clear and convincing evidence subject to
punitive damages).
68 This ignores the fact that liability may also serve to efficiently allocate risk of inaccuracy
between the parties. Non-legal sanctions often cannot be used for this purpose because
they do not provide compensation to the aggrieved party.
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means that rational contracting parties should compare the relative costs
and benefits of using non-legal as opposed to legal sanctions when
determining whether or not to disclaim legal liability.69 This comparison
will depend in part upon the relative costs associated with enforcing
legal and non-legal sanctions, i.e., the expected level of litigation costs if
legal liability is assumed versus the costs of using non-legal enforcement
mechanisms such as self-help and arbitration.70  For the reasons
discussed above, these costs will depend in part on the predictability of
the consequences of resorting to each sanctioning mechanism. The
discussion above also explains that the accuracy of each sanctioning
mechanism will affect how they compare in another important respect,
namely their likelihood of inducing the parties to take excessive
precautions. In addition, legal and non-legal sanctions should be
compared in terms of the extent to which they require the parties to
incur drafting costs. Depending upon the expertise of the person
imposing the sanction, it may be necessary to expend considerable
resources drafting pre-contractual representations in clear terms before
they can be enforced relably.71
Non-legal sanctions for misrepresentations can be a potent
substitute for legal sanctions? 2 This is especially likely where the non-
legal sanctions consist of one party to a transaction unilaterally altering
the terms of its future dealings with the other party (including the case
where they refuse to have any future dealings whatsoever),' 3 Under
69 See generally, Charny, supra note 60. However, parties' decisions to rely on non-legal
sanctions may deprive other members of society of the public goods associated with more
formal litigation. These public goods include the development of a set of precedents,
public revelation of information about the subject matter of disputes, and the salutary effect
of judicial decisions on social norms. See David Charny, Illusions of Spontaneous Order:
Norms in Contractual Relationships, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1841 at 1852 (1996) (citing Owen M.
Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L. J. 1073 (1984)).
70 Litigation costs can be defined extremely broadly to include all costs associated with
resolving disputes through the courts. These obviously include legal fees and filing fees
but may also include the costs associated with the publicity of legal proceedings. See, e.g.,
Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond
Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992).
71 In other words, failure to do so would lead to unpredictable judicial outcomes that would
in turn lead to the consequences identified above.
72 See Jonathan M. Karpoff & John R. Lott, Jr., The Reputational Penalty Firms Bear from
Committing Criminal Fraud , 36 J. L. & ECON 757, 780-89 (1993) (finding that the market
value of the common stock of corporations that were either alleged to have committed
fraud or were convicted of fraud fell significantly following announcement of the
allegations or conviction and that very little of the fall in value could be attributed to
expected legal penalties).
73See Karpoff & Lott, supra note 72, at 763-64; Chamy supra note 60, at 420-24.
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these circumstances, the risk of sanctions being mistakenly imposed on a
party who has taken adequate precautions is as low as can be expected; a
third party decision-maker would almost certainly have more difficulty
evaluating the parties' conduct. For similar reasons, these types of non-
legal sanctions may be more predictable than legal sanctions. In
addition, having sanctions imposed by one of the parties to the
transaction may also economize on drafting costs. Because the parties
are likely to be intimately familiar with all aspects of their agreement
from their course of dealing, and possibly also from their experience
with other similar transactions, their commitments may not have to be
explicit in order for them to be mutually intelligible so as to permit self-
enforcement. However, the same representations may need to be made
much more explicit before they will be sufficiently intelligible for a third
party to reliably enforce. 74 Of course, the drawback of relying on
unilaterally imposed sanctions is that one party will bear the risk that
sanctions will be imposed opportunistically. 75
To a lesser extent it may make sense for parties to rely upon non-
legal sanctions that are imposed by third parties such as arbitrators. The
expertise of these parties or the informality of their dispute resolution
procedures may permit the parties to avoid the unpredictable and
expensive judicial system. In these cases one would expect the parties to
explicitly assign responsibility for adjudicating their disputes to the third
party in their contract.
Finally, it is possible, but somewhat unlikely, that parties will
choose to avoid legal sanctions in order to rely upon non-legal sanctions
that can only be imposed by relatively uninformed third parties such as
other market participants. For example, an insurance company
considering defrauding some of its policy holders may be somewhat
deterred by the prospect of being unable to sell its products to other
individuals once it gains a reputation for lying. However, it is unlikely
that the parties would agree to let the company disclaim legal liability
and rely exclusively on fear of loss of reputation to deter fraud. This is
because the reputational sanction would be imposed by people-other
market participants-with relatively little information about the
74 This is another way of describing the distinction that economists draw between
observable and verifiable information. The implications of observability and verifiability
for parties' decisions to seek judicial enforcement are explored in Alan Schwartz, Relational
Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J.
LEGAL STUD. 271 (1992).
7 See Charny supra note 60, at 406-07.
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circumstances of any alleged fraud. Under these conditions the risk of
the sanction being imposed inconsistently or inappropriately is high.
This will tend to make these sorts of sanctions less attractive than legal
sanctions.
Of course in principle, sanctions imposed by the market may be
effective means of ensuring the accuracy of representations when
information about a person's misrepresentation can be broadcast quickly
and reliably among his potential trading partners. This means that third
parties must be able to determine readily that the representation was
made in the first place, that it was inaccurate, and that insufficient care
was taken to ensure its accuracy. This seems most likely to be possible in
situations involving representations that are broadcast widely, such as
claims made in advertising or promotional material, and whose falsity
can easily be demonstrated to the makers' potential trading partners.
Situations like this are quite rare. It seems far more likely that parties
will rely upon sanctions inflicted by market participants to complement
sanctions imposed by specific independent decision makers, like judges
or arbitrators, who have access to superior information about the
circumstances of alleged misrepresentations. 76
C. Summary
The economic arguments developed so far suggest that contracting
parties may often be able to obtain mutual benefits by disclaiming
liability for both fraudulent and negligent pre-contractual
misrepresentations in order to avoid potentially costly litigation. Parties
are also likely to benefit if courts respect disclaimers of liability for
misrepresentations that are neither fraudulent nor grossly negligent,
because this allows them to avoid the risk that courts will impose
liability in situations where an efficient level of care has been taken to
avoid making a misrepresentation. Finally, two scenarios in which
parties can rely on non-legal sanctions to deter their trading partners
76 For example, Karpoff & Lott, supra note 72, only found that firms' reputation suffered
after the disclosure of information, suggesting that the courts were likely to determine that
fraud had taken place. This suggests that potential legal liability may be necessary for the
fear of a loss of reputation to act as a deterrent, because the courts can provide credible
information about the existence of wrongdoing. Lisa Bernstein's study of the diamond
markets illustrates that arbitrator's decisions may also be a source of such information. She
found that diamond traders rarely needed to seek legal enforcement of arbitrator's
decisions. The decisions were published widely within the community of diamond dealers
and so traders had a strong incentive to comply with them in order to avoid exclusion from
the market. See Bernstein, supra note 70.
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from making misrepresentations have also been identified. One scenario
is where the parties can rely on unilaterally imposed non-legal sanctions,
such as the refusal to engage in future dealings. The other situation is
where the parties have delegated responsibility for adjudicating their
disputes to an independent third party such as an arbitrator. It is
relatively unlikely that parties will rely upon non-legal sanctions in other
situations, even if they are available, because they are likely to be less
predictable and accurate than legal sanctions.
V. MINIMIZING AGENCY COSTS
The arguments developed so far suggest that it may sometimes be
justifiable from a purely economic perspective to allow parties to
disclaim liability for both fraudulent and negligent misrepresentations.
However, none of the economic arguments address the moral objections
to enforcing disclaimers of liability for these kinds of misrepresentations
(although it may be possible to argue that these are assuaged when
parties assign responsibility for adjudicating their disputes to a third
party).n This section develops an under-emphasized yet intuitive
explanation for why it may be both morally defensible and economically
desirable to allow commercial parties to routinely disclaim liability for
all sorts of pre-contractual misrepresentations, including fraudulent
misrepresentations. The argument is simply that enforcing these sorts of
disclaimers may permit certain parties to minimize the costs of
transacting through agents.
A. The Moral Ramifications of Enforcing Disclaimers of Vicarious Liability
The vast majority of commercial transactions in our society involve
at least one party that is a corporation, partnership or other form of
business association. Those entities, which I will refer to as
"enterprises," typically act through agents who are responsible for both
negotiating and concluding contracts on behalf of the enterprise. This
means that most pre-contractual misrepresentations are made by agents
of enterprises. Yet when most lawyers speak of imposing liability for
pre-contractual misrepresentations made by agents, they are speaking
about imposing vicarious liability upon the agent's principal, the
enterprise, rather than just about imposing personal liability upon the
7 See infra Part VII.
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agent.78 In other words, lawyers often fail to draw a distinction between
imposing vicarious and primary liability in this context.
From a moral perspective it is critical to distinguish between the
primary responsibility of an agent who has made a false or negligent
misrepresentation and the vicarious responsibility of the enterprise on
whose behalf he acted. Many scholars question whether the enterprise
should be regarded as morally responsible in these situations.79 Some
question whether it is meaningful to speak about the moral
responsibility of an abstraction such as a corporation or a partnership,
while others question whether the fault of an agent should automatically
be attributed to such an entity.8° Others note, however, that many
enterprises can plausibly be viewed as morally responsible agents,
because they are capable of formulating and acting upon purposes that
are independent of the purposes of any individual member of the
enterprise.81 This analysis provides a logical basis for holding an
enterprise morally responsible for some of its agents' actions but does
not necessarily imply that the enterprise should be considered to be at
fault whenever one of its agents behaves fraudulently or negligently.
Rather, the enterprise should be responsible only when a purpose that
can truly be attributed to the enterprise, rather than merely its individual
agents, can be characterized as blameworthy.82
There are situations in which it seems appropriate to hold an
enterprise morally responsible for the fraudulent or negligent
misrepresentations of its agents. Some of the most prominent recent
examples are the cases involving brokerage firms whose brokers were
found to have perpetrated widespread frauds on consumers.83 More
generally, any case in which fraud and deception are demonstrated to be
entrenched features of corporate culture should qualify. Once those
cases are set aside, though, there remain many other cases in which it
seems inappropriate to saddle enterprises with moral responsibility for
their agents' misrepresentations. In these cases the enterprise's vicarious
78 See Restatement (Second) of Agency §§257-259A (1958) (stating the doctrinal basis for
holding a principal liable for his agent's misrepresentations).
For an overview of this debate, see Schwartz, supra note 8.
80 See, e.g., G. R. Sullivan, The Attribution of Culpability to Limited Companies, 55 CAMB. L.
J. 515 (1996).
81 See generally Brent Fisse & John Braithwaite, Corporations, Crime and Accountability 24-
31(1993).
82 Id.
83 See, e.g., In the Matter of PaineWebber Inc., SEC Admin. Proc. File No. 3-8928 January 17,
1996) available in Lexis SEC Release database.
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liability probably should be understood as a legal convention that lacks a
compelling moral foundation. However, this might be supported by
reference to either economic considerations or to social conceptions of
responsibility that have nothing to do with conventional morality.84 In
this respect vicarious liability is similar to other forms of strict liability,
because it is imposed without regard to moral fault.
So long as the imposition of vicarious liability is not required by
moral dictates there should be no moral objection to enforcing
agreements under which an enterprise and a third party agree to limit or
eliminate the enterprise's vicarious liability, especially if such an
agreement is likely to be mutually beneficial for the parties. Enforcing
these types of agreements in circumstances where the enterprise itself is
morally blameless serves to respect the will of the parties without
undermining the law's commitment to expressing disapprobation for
fraud and gross negligence. Under these conditions a disclaimer of
vicarious, as opposed to primary, liability does not serve to absolve any
morally responsible party of liability.
B. Using Disclaimers to Minimize Agency Costs
The standard economic analysis of disclaimers of individual liability
for fraudulent or negligent misrepresentations does not apply to
disclaimers of vicarious liability for fraudulent and negligent
misrepresentations. As mentioned above, economists take the view that
disclaimers of individual liability for fraud and negligence are
necessarily inefficient, assuming that the courts define both those
concepts to mean the failure to take precautions whose costs outweigh
their benefits and expected litigation costs are low. This is because the
disclaimer removes the threat of liability that would normally give the
beneficiary of the disclaimer an incentive to refrain from inefficient
behavior. But the fact that an enterprise's agent has acted fraudulently
or negligently does not mean that the enterprise itself has failed to take
cost-effective precautions. It is quite possible for an agent to make a
fraudulent misrepresentation even though the enterprise has taken all
reasonable precautions to prevent him from doing so. This suggests that
the economic analysis of disclaimers of vicarious liability might be quite
84 The economic justifications for vicarious liability are canvassed in the next section. For
an alternative to the dominant moral conception of responsibility and its emphasis on
freely chosen action as the basis of responsibility, see Meir Dan-Cohen, Responsibility and
the Boundaries of the Self, 105 HARV. L. REV. 959 (1992).
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different from the economic analysis of disclaimers of individual
liability.
From an economic, as well as a moral, perspective, it makes sense to
view vicarious liability as a form of strict liability. This is because
vicarious liability is imposed without regard to fault in the sense that an
economist is likely to define that term, namely the failure to take cost-
effective precautions. However, it is easier for an economist to defend
strict liability than it is for a moral philosopher. In a contractual setting,
imposing strict liability on the party who is able to take precautions
against causing harm at the least cost can induce that party to take an
optimal level of precautions if the correct level of damages is assessed8s
Generally speaking, damages should be set at a level equal to the harm
caused by the misrepresentation, adjusted only to reflect the possibility
that the misrepresentation and its related consequences will not be
detected.
At first glance it may seem efficient for an enterprise, rather than its
trading partners, to bear liability for all misrepresentations made by the
enterprise's agents. This is mainly because, as between the enterprise
and its trading partners, the enterprise seems to be able to prevent those
misrepresentations from being made at the least cost. The literature on
vicarious liability is replete with descriptions of enterprises' ability to
deter tortious and criminal acts by monitoring and sanctioning their
agents. In fact, the leading economic justifications for vicarious liability
are premised on the notion that enterprises are better equipped than
courts to prevent agents from misbehaving.8 However, these
discussions should not obscure the fact that there are limits to
enterprises' ability to control their agents' behavior.8 7 Sometimes, an
enterprise may not be in the best position to take precautions that
85 The seminal analysis is Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEG. STUD. 1
(1980).
86 Some of the most noteworthy contributions to this literature are John C. Coffee, Jr., "No
Soul to Damn No Body to Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate
Punishment, 79 MicH. L. REv. 386 (1981); Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies
and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L. J. 857 (1984); Alan 0. Sykes, The Boundaries of
Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal
Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563 (1988); Alan 0. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability,
93 YALE L. J. 1231 (1984).
8 This insight is potentially relevant in other contexts. See Jennifer Arlen & William
Carney, Vicarious Liability For Fraud On Securities Markets: Theory And Evidence, U. ILL. L.
REV. 691 (1992) (vicarious liability should not be imposed upon corporations whose agents
commit fraud on the market because firms have limited ability to identify and sanction
responsible agents).
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forestall the harm that might be caused by an agent's misrepresentation.
In certain circumstances the enterprise's trading partner is in the best
position to take such precautions. In these cases the parties may find it
mutually advantageous to adjust their potential liability for agents'
misrepresentations in a way that gives the trading partner an incentive
to take those precautions."
One of the most effective precautions that an enterprise can take to
reduce the harm likely to be caused by an agent's misrepresentations is
to monitor the agent's representations. This permits the enterprise to
verify the representations and to correct, clarify or retract any
misrepresentations before they can cause harm. Monitoring also helps
the enterprise to deter agents from making misrepresentations by
allowing it to sanction those agents whose misrepresentations are
detected. Of course the other precautions that can be taken also have
their drawbacks. For instance, an enterprise can attempt to screen agents
for honesty and carefulness. However, it may be difficult to do this with
any degree of reliability. Alternatively, the enterprise could limit the
occasions upon which agents are allowed to communicate with third
parties, but this might be prohibitively costly. Finally, the enterprise
might refrain from monitoring agents' representations prior to
contracting but instead attempt to deter agents by sanctioning them for
misrepresentations that are detected after the contract is concluded, for
example, when a customer sues. This may be the cheapest way of
achieving deterrence, because it involves minimal expenditures to detect
wrongdoing. But, unlike ex ante monitoring, a strategy that relies solely
on the investigating and the sanctioning taking place ex post does
nothing to prevent the agents who inevitably are not deterred from
causing harm.
Sometimes it will not be difficult for an enterprise to monitor its
agents' representations. In many situations, though, it will be impossible
for an enterprise to monitor all of the pre-contractual representations
being made by its agents at a reasonable cost. Of course this is most
likely to be the case where representations are being made orally,
especially when recording is impractical. Imagine how difficult it would
be for the board of directors of a large enterprise with a worldwide cast
of agents to be confident that they have been informed of all the
89 The following analysis parallels George Priest's explanation of the efficiency of limiting
the scope of consumer product warranties. See George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer
Product Warranty, 90 YALE L. J. 1297,1307-14 (1981).
1999]
Davis: Licensing Lies: Merger Clauses, the Parol Evidence Rule and Pre-C
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1999
512 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33
representations made by the enterprise's agents prior to the signing of a
major agreement.
In these types of situations it might be useful to recruit the
enterprise's trading partner to assist in the process of monitoring the
agent. The trading partner's assistance is valuable, because unlike the
enterprise, he is in an excellent position to be aware of all the
representations that have been made by the agent and whether they are
material. However, under a legal regime in which the enterprise will be
liable to the trading partner for losses caused by an agent's
misrepresentations whether or not the trading partner assists in
monitoring the agent, the trading partner will have little incentive to
assist the enterprise by sharing information about representations that
the enterprise cannot detect.
The solution to this dilemma is for the parties to agree to a contract
that gives the trading partner an incentive to disclose the private
information about material representations made by the enterprise's
agents that the enterprise may otherwise find difficult to detect. 89 In
practice, this is likely to involve the enterprise disclaiming liability for
pre-contractual representations not contained in the final agreement
between the parties. This gives the trading partner an incentive to
inform the enterprise if any material representations have been made
which contradict or supplement those contained in the agreement.
The key to the effectiveness of this scheme is the assumption that it
is less costly for the trading partner to be responsible for bringing pre-
contractual representations to the enterprise's attention than it is for the
enterprise to monitor them. There are two independent reasons why this
assumption is plausible. The first reason has already been suggested
above: some pre-contractual representations are inherently difficult for
an enterprise to monitor. But even if the enterprise is readily able to
monitor all of its agent's pre-contractual representations, it still may be
worthwhile for it to disclaim liability for all but a subset of those
representations. That is because the other party to the transaction may
"In some circumstances it may be possible to induce potential buyers to share information
regarding agents' representations without resorting to contractual mechanisms. For
example, in some telemarketing agencies, after finding a buyer who expresses interest in
purchasing the product being offered for sale, the agent is required to patch in her
supervisor who concludes the sale by repeating the terms of the transaction and then
asking if the agent made any representations inconsistent with those terms. Only sales
verified in this fashion are counted in setting the agent's compensation. Of course this type
of arrangement might be prohibitively costly to implement.
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have better information than the enterprise about which representations
are material. Ideally, an enterprise would assume liability for all the
representations that it can monitor at a reasonable cost and that it
believes are material to its trading partners, and the enterprise can
disclaim liability for the rest. The trading partner can then identify and
ask the enterprise to assume liability for any other material
representations if the enterprise seems to be in a superior position to
verify them or bear the risk of their inaccuracy. This way the enterprise
is saved the difficulty of monitoring representations that can either be
detected more cheaply by the trading partner or that are not material to
him.9° For example, it is likely to be far easier for the board of directors
of a large enterprise to monitor the limited set of representations
contained in its final written agreements as opposed to all
representations made in any format by the enterprise's agents.
VI. ILLUSTRATIONS
A. Protecting Dishonest Individuals
There seem to be relatively few cases in which the courts have held
that a contractual provision may bar claims of fraud brought against an
individual who is alleged to have personally committed the fraud. The
leading case is Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris.91 There the claim was that
the defendants had induced the plaintiff to buy a lease of a building by
making false oral representations about the operating expenses of the
building and its overall profitability.92 The written agreement between
the parties stated that the sellers had not made any representations "as to
the physical condition, rents, leases, expenses, operation or any other
matter or thing affecting or related to the aforesaid premises."9 The
90 This point has not been completely overlooked by other scholars. For example, WHITE &
SUMMERS, supra note 6, point out that merger clauses are useful to protect sellers against the
risk posed by unauthorized oral misrepresentations made by an "effusive salesperson."
However, they do not explore the economic ramifications of this insight and later hint that
they are divided about the appropriateness of allowing merger clauses to bar claims of
fraud. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 6. Dean Clark has also acknowledged the logic of
limiting a corporation's vicarious liability when a third party is in the best position to know
that one of the corporation's agents has exceeded his authority. See ROBERT CHARLES
CLARK, CORPORATE LAw 121 (1986). Goldberg makes a similar argument in favor of
permitting accounting firms to disclaim liability for the fraud of their employees and
partners. See Victor P. Goldberg, Accountable Accountants: Is Third Party Liability Necessary?
27 J. LEGAL STUD. 295 (1988).
91157 N.E.2d 597 (N.Y. 1959). See also Butts v. Groover, 16 S. E. 2d 894 (Ga. Ct. App. 1941).
92 Id. at 598.
93 Id.
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agreement went on to state that neither party was "relying upon any
statement or representation, not embodied in this contract, made by the
other."94 The majority held that this specific disclaimer of reliance on the
very types of representations that constituted the alleged fraud barred
the plaintiff from claiming that it had justifiably relied on any fraudulent
pre-contractual misrepresentations. 95 Judge Fuld wrote a strong dissent,
arguing for the application of the well-established general rule that no
contractual provision should bar a claim for fraud.96
The Danann rule is consistent with the notion that contract law is
designed to give effect to the will of the parties and thus they should be
free to waive their rights to seek legal redress for fraud. The decision is
also defensible in economic terms. From an ex ante perspective, the
parties may have benefited from a rule that allowed them to avoid the
costs of litigating baseless allegations of fraud. However, an important,
and perhaps fatal, objection to the Danann rule is that it is difficult to
reconcile with the notion that the law ought to consistently express both
respect for the exercise of individual autonomy and disapprobation of
acts of deception that interfere with the exercise of individual autonomy.
Some may defend this position on deontological grounds, but as
indicated above, it is also possible to criticize the Danann rule from an
instrumental perspective. As a number of scholars have observed, legal
rules do not only influence behavior by inducing members of society to
refrain from illegal behavior out of fear of punishment. People also tend
to internalize legal rules and obey them simply because they are legal
rules, rather than because breach of the rules is accompanied by
sanctions. Therefore, one might argue that the law should manifest a
steadfast commitment to honesty because this will tend to encourage
members of society to internalize a norm of behaving honestly, even in
contexts where they can reasonably expect to avoid being sanctioned if
they behave dishonestly.97 A society in which internalization of norms of
honesty is widespread will benefit by having less need to choose
between resorting to the legal system to coerce honesty or else incurring
the losses that flow from having members of a distrustful society take
costly precautions against being victimized. These benefits are virtually
% Id.
95aId. at 600.
96 Danann Realty Corp v. Harris, 157 N.E.2d 597,600 (N.Y. 1959).
9 For an interesting analysis along these lines, see Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and
Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585 (1998).
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impossible to measure but may be substantial.98 These factors weigh
against adopting any legal rule that allows individuals to escape
personal liability for fraud.
Finally, the disclaimer in Danann was not sufficiently explicit to
qualify as a retraction. Before allowing the sellers to escape liability on
the grounds of a retraction, they should have been forced to present
evidence that they had specifically brought the previous
misrepresentation to the buyer's attention and explained that it was in
fact unreliable.
B. Controlling Overly Enthusiastic Agents
The paradigmatic case in which it might make sense to enforce a
disclaimer of liability for pre-contractual representations is in the context
of an agreement of purchase and sale where the seller's agent is a)
primarily responsible for providing information to the buyer prior to
contracting and b) has strong incentives to see that the transaction is
concluded. Agents placed in these situations will often have strong
incentives to make either fraudulent or negligent misrepresentations.
This is obviously most likely to be the case where the agent's
compensation is tied directly to his or her success in concluding sales on
behalf of the seller.
A classic example of how a disclaimer clause can be used to mitigate
the consequences of this undesirable set of incentives is provided by the
facts of Northwestern Rug Mfg. Co. v. Leftwich Hardware & Furniture Co. 9
In that case, Northwestern's salesman told Leftwich that he had not sold
and would not sell any of his goods to any other merchant in Leftwich's
town. In other words, he promised Leftwich an exclusive agency.
Leftwich proved at trial that the salesman had sold the same goods to
two other merchants in the town on the same day, both before and after
the sale to Leftwich took place. The appellate court upheld a jury verdict
against Northwestern despite the fact that the parties were both
merchants and their agreement made no mention of the exclusive
agency. Rather the contract stated, "Any special terms or agreements
with the salesman will not be binding unless specified above."10° The
9 See James S. Coleman, Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital, 94 AM. J. OF Soc. 95
(1988). See generally FRANCIS FUKAYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION
OF PROSPERMTY (1995).
-2 S.W.2d 1109 (Ark. 1928).
10 lId. at 1110.
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court ignored the fact that as between Northwestern's owners and
Leftwich, Leftwich was in a far better position to protect himself against
the mendacious traveling salesman. If the exclusive agency agreement
was important to Leftwich, he should have asked the salesman to add it
to their written agreement. The salesman would probably have been
reluctant to put his promise in writing, because this would have made it
easy for his head office to detect his (presumably) unauthorized
representation. He would have been particularly reluctant if the contract
was of a type that would not be effective until it was approved by his
head office. 0 1
Another classic example of a case in which an enforceable disclaimer
could have helped the parties minimize agency costs is Bates v.
Southgate.12 To recap, in that case a stock broker sued the two partners
of a brokerage firm, alleging that one partner had induced him to buy
the shares of gypsum company by falsely representing that the company
had received a large and potentially lucrative order. The confirmation
slip issued by the defendants' firm stated "in making this transaction, we
make no representation other than to identify the security and state the
price." 10 3 The court held that the slip could not bar a claim based in
fraud for policy reasons.1° 4
Justice Qua suggested that this case could be distinguished from
other cases in which misrepresentations were made through an agent,
because "the parties dealt directly with each other."105 It is not clear how
this conclusion can be supported insofar as it concerns the partners who
were not accused of making any false representations. Those innocent
partners' liability was purely vicarious. From an economic perspective
the implications of permitting people to disclaim vicarious liability for
their partner's misrepresentations are the same as the implications of
permitting them to disclaim vicarious liability for an employee's
misrepresentations. Enforcing the disclaimer would allow the innocent
partners to focus their monitoring efforts exclusively on the confirmation
slips rather than having each of them keep an ear cocked throughout the
day to eavesdrop on their partners' telephone conversations. It should
101 Compare Cannon v. Burrell, 79 N.E. 780 (Mass. 1907) with Colonial Dev. Corp. v.
Bragdon, 106 N.E. 633 (Mass 1914).
10 31 N.E.2d 551 (Mass. 1941).
103 Id. at 552.
104 Id. at 558.
105 Id. at 558-59.
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not be difficult to imagine circumstances in which this might be
desirable.
It is important to emphasize that the claim being made here is that
economic considerations weigh in favor of giving parties the option of
disclaiming vicarious liability for certain pre-contractual
misrepresentations. It is not being claimed that parties will necessarily
find it beneficial to exercise that option. For instance, some or all of
Southgate's customers might well have decided that virtually everything
their brokers told them was material. Those customers might have
found it prohibitively costly to attempt to incorporate all the relevant
representations and warranties into a formal written document.
Therefore, they would probably refuse to allow Southgate to disclaim
liability for pre-contractual misrepresentations. By doing so, they would
effectively decline to be responsible for helping the members of the
partnership monitor one another. Under circumstances like this, the
members of the partnership would fall back on alternative methods of
deterring or preventing their partners from making misrepresentations.
These might include more careful screening of prospective partners and
more intense monitoring of existing partners.
An alternative scenario is that certain firms might find it less
necessary to monitor agents because they screen their partners more
carefully. In fact, such firms' partners might not only refrain from
getting their customers involved in monitoring their fellow partners, but
they could also avoid using internal mechanisms to monitor one another
either. Those firms would attempt to capitalize on their relatively low
monitoring costs by offering to assume liability for all pre-contractual
misrepresentations at a relatively low premium. In effect, the partners of
those firms would capitalize on their collective honesty and
trustworthiness by offering to put the assets of every partner behind the
word of each individual partner.
Each of the two scenarios described above, or some combination of
them both, seems plausible. One or the other might even describe the
norm in many industries. However, it also seems plausible that there
will be scenarios in which customers do not wish to pay a premium to
have a firm subject its partners to searching scrutiny. Those customers
may be willing to bear the responsibility for ensuring that all material
representations are included in an easily monitored final agreement.
This may either be because they don't find it costly to draft an agreement
that incorporates all material representations, or else because they are
willing to abandon recourse against the assets of the partnership and rely
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solely upon the assets of the individual with whom they are dealing.
Those customers will benefit from having the option of dealing with a
firm that is able to disclaim liability for its partners' pre-contractual
misrepresentations.
It is difficult to understand how anyone could complain on moral
grounds had the decisions in either Northwestern or Bates had gone the
other way. Anyone who favors the will theory of contract law should
accept the propriety of a decision to enforce a disclaimer clause once they
are satisfied that, at the time of contracting, both parties understood its
effect and were not coerced. These pre-conditions to voluntary
agreement were probably present in both cases. Both Leftwich and Bates
apparently were experienced merchants and there was no suggestion of
coercion in the cases. Bates especially seems to have understood that the
ordinary effect of the confirmation slip would be to bar any action based
on a pre-contractual misrepresentation. It seems unlikely that either
would have been surprised to discover that the clause barred an action
for a non-fraudulent misrepresentation. The fact that we can easily show
why it may have been mutually beneficial for the parties to enter into an
agreement containing this sort of disclaimer should go a long way
towards alleviating any nagging doubts about whether the agreement
was voluntary.
It also is difficult to see how allowing the disclaimer clauses at issue
in these two cases to bar the imposition of vicarious liability would
undermine the law's general prohibition of fraud. I am not suggesting
that either the salesman in Northwestern or the stockbroker in Bates
should have been relieved of liability for their fraud. They both seem to
be morally culpable, and so it is arguably inappropriate to allow them to
escape liability. The same cannot be said, however, of the salesman's
employer or the broker's partners. They effectively gave notice to their
customers that they would not be monitoring their agents' pre-
contractual representations and so would not necessarily be able to
prevent their agents from committing fraud. The customers agreed to
contract on those terms. It is difficult to formulate a theory that would
ascribe moral responsibility for the agents' fraud to the employer or the
brokerage firm under these circumstances. The employers and the
brokerage firm seem to be just as innocent as their customers. There
should be no moral objection to enforcing a contract by which two
innocent parties attempt to allocate the. risk of losses caused by a third
party's malfeasance. Therefore, there should be no objection to enforcing
contracts under which parties like the employer in Northwestern and the
brokerage firm in Bates agree with their respective customers to allocate
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the risk of losses caused by agents' pre-contractual misrepresentations to
the customers.
This analysis is consistent with the recent cases in which the courts
have enforced disclaimers of liability for even fraudulent
misrepresentations contained in contracts between sophisticated parties.
For instance, despite the teachings of Bates, a number of circuits have
dismissed claims of fraud brought by customers of brokerage firms on
the grounds that any fraudulent misrepresentation made prior to the
impugned transaction were refuted by information contained in the
prospectus. In the typical case, the plaintiffs allege that the firm's
representatives misrepresented the risks associated with the investment
to them in both oral and written material. The defendants then point to a
lengthy prospectus that invariably makes full, true, and plain disclosure
of all the risks associated with the scheme. The prospectus also typically
states, "no person has been authorized to give any information or to
make any representations, other than those contained in this prospectus,
and if given or made, such information or representations must not be
relied upon."
More often than not courts presented with these facts conclude that
the plaintiff's reliance upon the misrepresentations was unjustifiable,
whether or not the plaintiff read the prospectus. 1°6 Because justifiable
reliance is an essential element of the 10b-5 claims that are brought by
most of these plaintiffs, a finding of unjustifiable reliance serves to
destroy their claim.107 From an economic perspective this result is
appropriate in cases involving sophisticated parties, because it permits
brokerage firms to focus on monitoring the representations made in one
document-the prospectus-without fear of being held liable for their
agents' extrinsic oral or written representations. This seems to be the
most cost-effective way of monitoring agents108
One aspect of these decisions is troubling. In all of these cases, the
finding of unjustifiable reliance serves to bar claims against the
individual broker as well as the broker's firm. This sends the wrong
06 See, e.g., Zobrist v. Coal-X Inc. 708 F.2d 1511 (10th Cir. 1983); Brown v. The E.F. Hutton
Group, 735 F. Supp. 1196 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), affd, 991 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1993). See further
cases cited in Margaret V. Sachs, Freedom of Contract: The Trojan Horse of Rule 10B-5, 51
WASH & LEE L. REV. 879,883 (1994).
107 The situation may be different in actions brought under section 12(2). See MidAmerica
Federal S & L v. Shearson/American Express, 886 F.2d 1249 (10th Cir. 1989).
108 Some courts have explicitly mentioned this argument in their reasons. See Acme
Propane, Inc. v. Tenexco Inc., 844 F. 2d 1317, 1321-22 (7th Cir. 1988).
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message to brokers. For the broker, the lesson to be learned from this
line of cases is not that fraud is reprehensible, but rather that fraud is an
acceptable part of a sales pitch so long as at the end of the day one goes
through the formality of sending the prospective customer a prospectus.
This is inappropriate for the same reasons that it is inappropriate for the
courts to permit individuals to disclaim liability for their frauds. Brokers
receiving these kinds of lessons from the courts are far less likely to
internalize a norm of honesty than brokers who face legal sanctions for
their misrepresentations. This argument applies even if most brokers
have insufficient assets to make it worthwhile for investors to sue them.
An unequivocal judicial pronouncement that fraud is clearly unlawful
might be sufficient to induce meaningful changes in brokers' behavior
even if it is not backed by any significant threat of liability. 1°9
VII. PROTECTING CULPABLE ORGANIZATIONS
So far this article has established that enterprises should generally
be allowed to disclaim vicarious liability for the misrepresentations of
their agents. It has also argued that this position is compatible with the
notion that morally blameworthy individuals should not be permitted to
use contractual provisions to shield themselves from liability. This begs
an important question: should morally blameworthy enterprises be
permitted to disclaim liability for fraud or negligence?
Take, for example, an enterprise whose agents are found to have
engaged in numerous acts of deception for over two years. Assume that
in some cases the agents intentionally attempted to deceive their
customers, but that in other cases their misrepresentations can be
attributed to the fact that they were provided with erroneous or
incomplete information about their products. A large number of people
within the enterprise can be blamed for failing to ensure that the agents
received accurate information. All of the customers of the enterprise are
sophisticated and sign agreements that include disclaimers of liability for
agents' pre-contractual misrepresentations. Should the disclaimers be
enforced?
To some, enforcement under these circumstances will seem morally
objectionable. The most plausible basis for this objection is that
enforcement will tend to undermine respect for the general principle of
honesty. However, this argument is only tenable if it can be shown that
109 Brokers are still likely to face administrative penalties in these circumstances. See In re
Foster, Exchange Act Release No. 3-8423, 1994 SEC Lexis 2107, at *6 (July 20, 1994).
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the enterprise is worthy of blame. Otherwise, the law's failure to provide
redress for harm caused by the enterprise's agents will not be perceived
as an instance of toleration of moral failing, but rather as an
unremarkable case in which the law fails to provide compensation to
those who have suffered bad luck.
The argument that enterprises can be blameworthy rests on the
notion that they are capable of both formulating policies to guide their
actions and changing those policies in response to moral strictures. In
the hypothetical presented here, the enterprise's policies clearly create a
substantial risk that misrepresentations will be made to its customers.
Even if the enterprise reasonably expects its customers to participate in
the monitoring of the enterprise's agents by insisting that all material
representations be put in writing, it seems clear that the enterprise has
failed to take adequate precautions against deception. To some, this is
sufficient to support the conclusion that the enterprise is morally
culpable.110 Skeptics should note that this type of reasoning about the
moral status of organizations is now embodied in the rules used to
determine the culpability of enterprises for sentencing purposes in the
criminal context,"' suggesting that it reflects a fairly broad social
consensus.
The next step is to see whether economic analysis sheds any light on
the question of how the courts should resolve the question posed in the
hypothetical. It might seem that economic considerations justify
enforcing the disclaimer clause regardless of the enterprise's overall lack
of due diligence. On this basis some might conclude that it is
appropriate to enforce the disclaimer clauses. However, a closer review
of the economic argument in favor of enforcement reveals that it does
not require the courts to enforce disclaimers in these circumstances.
The economic logic behind enforcing disclaimers of vicarious
liability is to minimize the cost of the precautions taken by enterprises
and their trading partners to guard against agents' misrepresentations.
As indicated above, disclaimers can be used to give enterprises and their
trading partners incentives to allocate responsibility for taking
precautions in an efficient manner. Notice that the argument only
110 Attributing responsibility to the enterprise as well as its individual agents also seems
appropriate given the difficulty of identifying all culpable individuals in these
circumstances.
"I See generally United States" Sentencing Commission, Federal Sentencing Guidelines
Manual 1-11 (1998-99 ed. 1997).
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supports enforcing disclaimers to the extent necessary to induce
enterprises and their trading partners to take an efficient level of
precautions.
But what if both the enterprise and its trading partner fail to take
adequate precautions? Is there anything wrong with refusing to enforce
the disclaimer then? This can only enhance the enterprise's incentive to
take adequate precautions. Therefore, the only possible source of
concern is that refusing to enforce disclaimers in these circumstances will
dilute the trading partner's incentive to take precautions. However, this
does not seem like a basis for significant concern, because the trading
partner should expect the enterprise to take adequate precautions.
Therefore, in principle, there should be little objection on economic
grounds to a rule that states that disclaimers of vicarious liability are
unenforceable where the enterprise has failed to take adequate
precautions against making misrepresentations. 112  I should note,
however, that this only holds if the failure to take adequate precautions
is defined in economic terms and thus means the failure to take all
precautions that are cost-effective. It is also important to remember that
it may not be cost-effective for the enterprise to take certain precautions
when its trading partner can readily monitor agents' representations.
The proposition that courts are unwilling to allow morally culpable
or, for those who prefer more legalistic terminology, grossly negligent
enterprises to escape being held liable for their agents'
misrepresentations seems to explain the results of a number of decided
cases and is consistent with leading commentators' assessment of the
state of the law in this area.113 For example, the most notorious and
recent instance of a court refusing to give effect to a disclaimer of liability
for pre-contractual misrepresentations involved a claim brought against
A. 0. Smith Harvestore Products, Inc. ("AOSHPI").1 14 AOSHPI is a silo
manufacturer that was sued by dozens of customers after
misrepresenting the ability of its silos to keep oxygen from coming into
contact with the feed stored in them. Feed exposed to oxygen becomes
moldy or spoils and is harmful to livestock. AOSHPI was found to have
112 This result can be expressed in terms more familiar to law and economics scholars. The
text contends that two parties, A and B, in a contractual relationship can be induced to take
efficient levels of precautions by a legal nle that provides that A is strictly liable subject to
a defense of contributory negligence, even if the defense is not permitted when A is
negligent.
113 See supra note 6.
1
4 See Keller v. A. 0. Smith Harvestore Products, Inc. 819 P.2d 69 (Colo. 1991).
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repeatedly misrepresented the capability of its silos to eliminate oxygen,
well after the company's own engineering studies, tests, and patent
documentation, as well as complaints from farmers should have made it
aware that grain stored in Harvestore silos was subject to excessive
spoilage. 115 Given this factual setting it should not be surprising that the
Colorado Supreme Court ruled that AOSHPI could not shield itself from
liability for negligent misrepresentations by relying upon an extremely
explicit disclaimer of liability contained in sales agreements signed by
the plaintiffs.116  Similar factors may explain the results in cases
involving franchisees and sellers of home equipment.11 7
VIII. EXPLOITING VULNERABLE CONSUMERS
The preceding analysis is primarily intended to support the
enforcement of disclaimers of liability for fraudulent pre-contractual
"s See Korf v. A. 0. Smith Harvestore Prod. Inc., 917 F.2d 480, 485 (10th Cir. 1990). See
generally Richard Meryhew, $4.2 Million Award Against Silo Maker Upheld, STAR TRIBUNE
Aug. 12, 1992 at 2B available in LEXIS NEWS LIBRARY; Jury: A. 0. Smith Corp. Violated
Racketeering Act, WISCONSIN STATE JOURNAL, May 23, 1996 at 3F available in LEXIS NEWS
LIBRARY.
1
6 See Keller v. A. 0. Smith Harvestore Products, Inc., 819 P.2d 69, 71 (Colo. 1991) in which
the purchase orders signed by the plaintiffs contained the following provisions:
This order form is the entire and only agreement between the Seller
and Buyer; and no oral statements or agreements not confirmed
herein, or by a subsequent written agreement, shall be binding on
either the Seller or Buyer....
Buyer understands the conditions of use of the products and is not
relying on the skill or judgment of the Manufacturer or Seller in
selecting them because Buyer acknowledges that farming and livestock
feeding results are very much the product of individual effort,
combined [**4] with various climatic, soil, water, growing and
feeding conditions which are beyond the control of the Manufacturer
and Seller. Buyer recognizes that any advertisements, brochures, and
other written statements which he may have read... are not guarantees
and he has not relied upon them as such... .Buyer understands that the
sole warranty, express or implied, which is provided by [AOSHPI]... is
as follows....
I [BUYER] HAVE READ AND UNDERSTOOD THE TERMS AND
CONDITIONS OF THIS PURCHASE ORDER INCLUDING THE
WARRANTIES, DISCLAIMERS AND TERMS AND CONDITIONS
HEREIN GIVEN TO ME, EITHER BY THE MANUFACTURER OR
THE SELLER. I RELY ON NO OTHER PROMISES OR CONDITIONS
AND REGARD THAT AS REASONABLE BECAUSE THESE ARE
FULLY ACCEPTABLE TO ME.
Id. at 71.
17See Moffatt Enters., Inc. v. Borden, Inc., 807 F.2d 1169 (3d Cir. 1986); Holland Furnace Co.
v. Williams, 295 P.2d 672 (Kan. 1956).
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misrepresentations in transactions involving reasonably sophisticated
commercial parties. Nothing said so far justifies enforcing those
disclaimers against parties who failed to appreciate the consequences of
agreeing to the disclaimer.1 18 Nor can we justify enforcing a disclaimer
against a party for whom it would have been prohibitively costly to
modify a contract containing a disclaimer to reflect pre-contractual
statements upon which they planned to rely.1 9 Both the will theory of
contract law and economic theories of contract law suggest that courts
should interpret disclaimer clauses narrowly under these
circumstances.1 20 These considerations suggest that courts should be
reluctant to enforce disclaimers against consumers in transactions
involving goods or services with a fairly low value, particularly when
the disclaimer in question is so vaguely worded that its effect is likely to
be misunderstood.
In principle, the concern about ensuring that parties appreciate the
consequences of agreeing to a disclaimer also suggests that it is
inappropriate to enforce a disclaimer against any parties who tend to
over-estimate the accuracy of pre-contractual representations for which
liability has been disclaimed. In other words, it may be inappropriate to
enforce disclaimers of liability for pre-contractual misrepresentations
against people who systematically invest an undue amount of trust in
their trading partners. At first glance one might think that although this
concern might arise in isolated cases, it should not affect the general
conclusion that most disclaimers of vicarious liability of
misrepresentations should be enforced. There would seem to be no
reason to believe that people will routinely be overly trusting in their
118 This point is most frequently discussed in connection with disclaimers of liability for
defective products. For a survey of the extensive literature, see Steven P. Croley & Jon P.
Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived Case for Enterprise Liability, 91 MICH. L. REV.
683(1993).
"9 See Eric A. Posner, Essay, The Parol Evidence Rule, The Plain Meaning Rule, and the
Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 146 U. PENN. L. REv. 533 (1998). This seems most
likely to be relevant where there are numerous pre-contractual representations or where
the value of the transaction is so low that it is not cost-effective for the recipient of the pre-
contractual representations even to read the final written agreement.
120 Under these circumstances it becomes difficult to argue that the terms of the written
agreement represent the will of the parties. From an economic perspective, the concern is
that a person who underestimates the risk associated with agreeing to let an enterprise
disclaim liability for pre-contractual misrepresentations will not make efficient decisions
about whether to agree to such disclaimers. A slightly different concern is that uninformed
people who agree to disclaimers will, because of their lack of information, underestimate
the expected cost of an inaccurate pre-contractual misrepresentation and so fail to take
adequate precautions against the harm that may result from inaccuracy.
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commercial dealings. However, in an important recent article Professor
Langevoort seems to suggest that experienced salespeople can and do
systematically cultivate inordinate levels of trust among their
customers.
121
Much of Professor Langevoort's article is concerned with showing
that both individual investors and professional investment agents are
prone to take significant risks when motivated by greed or faced with
either the prospect of a loss or a risk that is not salient and has a low
probability of materializing. He also mentions that both types of
investors are likely to be persistently overconfident, meaning that they
overestimate their ability to perceive risk and learn slowly from their
mistakes. He then suggests that brokers have both the motive and the
opportunity to take advantage of these cognitive illusions to induce their
customers to purchase risky securities.
Professor Langevoort suggests that factors similar to those which
distort customers' valuation of securities also distort their perceptions of
the trustworthiness of brokers. 122 He claims that even professional
investors can be overwhelmed by greed, the fear of experiencing loss,
and the fear of appearing ignorant; under these circumstances people
naturally tend to be more willing to trust even total strangers. 123 He also
seems to believe that investors overestimate the extent to which fear of
loss of reputation will constrain their brokers.12 4 If true these claims
present a significant objection to the central thesis of this paper, namely
that people ought to be permitted to agree to contracts that contain
disclaimers of liability for pre-contractual misrepresentations. In
essence, Langevoort suggests that people can frequently be induced to
make bad decisions about whether to trust their trading partners as
121 Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law from Behavioral
Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 627 (1996).
122 Professor Langevoort's analysis, supra note 121, raises the possibility that brokers are
able to persuade their customers to assume excessive risk even if they do not misrepresent
the riskiness of their products. This implies that it might be appropriate to impose a duty
on brokers to avoid resorting to psychological manipulation and perhaps even to overstate
the riskiness of securities to certain investors. Professor Langevoort does not seem willing
to propose such a radical transformation in the law governing broker-investor interactions.
Instead, he focuses on the situations in which the broker not only manipulates the
investor's preferences for risk but also makes material misrepresentations about matters
such as the securities' risk and return.
12 3 Langevoort, supra note 121, at 652-58.
124 Id
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opposed to insisting that they assume liability for pre-contractual
representations.
There is no doubt that many individuals are susceptible to this kind
of manipulation of their cognitive processes. It may even be the case that
all individuals acting on their own behalf should be presumed to be
vulnerable to this sort of exploitation and so barred from agreeing to
many types of disclaimers of liability. This would be consistent with the
thrust of contemporary consumer protection legislation, including
product liability law. However, Langevoort fails to present a compelling
argument that relatively large profit-seeking organizations such as the
institutional investors that he spends so much time discussing are
incapable of protecting themselves from attempts to manipulate the
perceptions of their agents.
There are a number of ways in which an enterprise might protect
itself. For starters it might try to hire the least gullible agents available.
This should, in turn, induce those seeking to become agents to learn how
to be "a tough sell". 125 Enterprises might also engage in some form of
monitoring. In many contexts this is most likely to consist of having
lawyers play a significant role in important transactions. Lawyers, and
especially those that belong to independent law firms, are specifically
trained to be distrustful and often have a material incentive to see that
agreements are put in a legally binding form.1 26 Finally, if none of these
options are viable, enterprises might simply formulate policies that
require their agents to deal only with especially reputable trading
partners or else insist that all material agreements be put in legally
binding form.
This last point suggests that the best way of conceptualizing these
types of situations is to think of two enterprises trying to minimize the
costs of being forced to conclude their transaction through agents. One
enterprise is trying to minimize the potential costs associated with the
fact that some of its agents are untrustworthy. The other enterprise is
concerned with minimizing the costs associated with the fact that its
125 Id. at 656 n.94 (considering this possibility but suggesting that people who are inclined to
be resistant to sales pitches might be too rigid to be successful investment agents).
126 The role that lawyers might play in helping to dispel their clients' cognitive illusions is a
topic that does not seem to have been adequately explored in the growing literature on
behavioral economics. But see Rachlinski, supra note 63, at 170-73. For a general discussion
of the ways in which various institutions in society transform preferences, see Jonathon R.
Macey, Packaged Preferences and the Institutional Transformation of Interests, 61 U. CHI. L. REV.
1443 (1994).
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agents are overly trusting. There is no reason to presume ex ante that the
optimal solution to this problem is for the enterprise with the
untrustworthy agents to assume liability for all of their
misrepresentations. In some situations it may be best to force the other
enterprise to ensure that its agents are less trusting. It is difficult to see
why the law should prevent enterprises from pursuing this option.
DC. IMPLICATIONS FOR JUDICIAL POLICY
This article has posited itself in a position to reassess the various
approaches that courts have taken to determining the enforceability of
disclaimers of liability for fraudulent and negligent pre-contractual
misrepresentations. Recall that many courts bar even sophisticated
parties from contracting out of liability for fraud. Some courts have gone
even further and limited parties' ability to contract out of liability for
negligent misrepresentations. On the other hand, it is possible to find
cases in which a contractual provision has shielded even individuals
from liability for fraud. In most of those cases the individual was an
agent of the enterprise that contracted with the defrauded party, but
occasionally individuals have been protected from liability by contracts
that they negotiated on their own behalf. The drafters of the
Restatement (Second) of Agency adopted something of a compromise.
They recognized that it might make sense to permit an innocent
principal to disclaim liability for deceit based on his agents'
misrepresentations. However, they would only permit a contractual
provision to affect a person's ability to rescind a contract on the basis of a
misrepresentation in rare circumstances. The drafters of the Restatement
also adopted a rather peculiar definition of an innocent principal.
The analysis in this article challenges all of these approaches. Rather
than restating the grounds of that challenge, I will devote the remainder
of this article to defending the preferred approach. That approach
consists of adhering to the following principles.
1. An individual cannot rely upon a contractual provision to
prevent another person from avoiding a contract that the
individual procured by means of a fraudulent
misrepresentation.
This rule is consistent with the moralistic view that contract law
should not condone fraud in any way. On the other hand, it is
inconsistent with the pure form of the will theory that holds that courts
must respect individual autonomy by enforcing all voluntary contractual
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obligations. Ultimately, however, the argument that condoning fraud
involves endorsing a refusal to respect individual autonomy and
therefore is fundamentally incompatible with the will theory is most
persuasive.
This first rule may also come into conflict with the view that all
economically efficient agreements should be enforced. It is conceivable
that parties might want to disclaim liability for even fraudulent pre-
contractual misrepresentations in order to reduce expected litigation
costs; Rule 1 would keep them from doing that. The economic
significance of this restriction on freedom of contract seems minimal
though. First of all, over the long run, enforcement of this rule may have
an economically beneficial impact upon people's propensities to engage
in fraudulent behavior. Second, this rule would only have an adverse
economic impact upon a relatively small set of transactions, namely
those involving individuals who wish to disclaim liability for fraud
when contracting with relatively sophisticated parties. This is because
the rule does not apply to enterprises that attempt to disclaim liability
and because Rule 4 (below) would bar an individual from relieving
herself of liability to consumers for fraud in any event. Another point to
keep in mind is that Rule 1 will only have an adverse impact on parties
who wish to disclaim liability for fraud in order to avoid incurring
litigation costs, as opposed to those who do so inadvertently or because
the costs of putting a representation in legally enforceable form are
prohibitive.
If courts were to accept Rule 1, they would refuse to follow cases
like Danann in which individuals have essentially been allowed to
contract out of liability for fraud. This rule should not however bar
people from enforcing agreements to have claims of fraud settled by
arbitration. A court that allows a person alleged to have committed
fraud to rely upon an arbitration agreement should not be seen as
condoning fraud; it is simply permitting another body to make the
necessary determination of the propriety of the person's conduct in
relation to his or her trading partner. The courts should not be
presumed to have exclusive authority to vindicate private rights. 127 Of
12 This is particularly compatible with the view that the right to a remedy for fraud is an
inherently personal right which may, but need not, be vindicated by the courts so long as it
is vindicated in some forum. See Edward M. Morgan, Contract Theory and The Sources of
Rights: An Approach to The Arbitrability Question, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1059 (1987). On this
view, however, the disclaimer would not necessarily bar a criminal prosecution for fraud,
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 33, No. 2 [1999], Art. 3
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol33/iss2/3
1999] LICENSING LIES 529
course enforcing arbitration agreements is also compatible with the will
theory and is quite likely to be efficient as well.
Finally, in rare cases it may be possible to conclude that a person has
effectively retracted a prior fraudulent misrepresentation. In these
circumstances it may be appropriate to conclude that a subsequent
contract was not "procured by" the misrepresentation. However, this
conclusion should not be reached unless the misrepresentation was
specifically brought to the attention of the party and then identified as
unreliable.
2. A principal may rely upon a contract with another person to
prevent that person from avoiding a contract with the principal
or holding the principal liable in any way because of a
misrepresentation made by an agent, including a
misrepresentation that was made fraudulently or in a grossly
negligent manner.
This rule is much easier to defend than Rule 1. Obviously, Rule 2 is
fully compatible with the will theory. It will also usually be compatible
with moral values, because it typically does not require the courts to
endorse any form of wrongdoing on the part of the principal. Contrary
to the view that is implicit in the Restatement (Second) of Agency, it is
not immoral to permit a principal to keep the benefit of a fraudulently
induced agreement when another party has expressly agreed to this way
of dealing with the consequences of an agent's fraud. This seems
particularly reasonable in light of the fact that such agreements will often
be mutually beneficial to parties who wish to minimize the costs of
transacting through agents.
From an economic perspective this rule seems like a significant
improvement over the Restatement (Second) of Agency, which would
almost always permit a contract induced by an agent's misrepresentation
to be rescinded. Although rescission is a relatively mild remedy, a rule
that virtually guarantees its availability still imposes costs upon a
principal, because it exposes him to the risk of costly litigation and
because that proceeding would seek to vindicate public rights, a function that is presumed
to be within the exclusive competence of the state.
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increases the risk of uncompensated detrimental reliance upon an
agreement prior to its being rescinded.128
The central thesis of this article is that it is critical for courts to
distinguish between the situations covered by Rule 1 and those covered
by Rule 2. In other words, judges must recognize the difference between
disclaimers of primary liability and disclaimers of vicarious liability.
This distinction could result in substantial economic benefits for certain
types of sophisticated contracting parties, including many that have not
been discussed so far in this article. To give one more example,
corporate acquisitions frequently give rise to situations in which agents
have incentives to make misrepresentations that cannot be easily
monitored by their principals. A classic situation is where employees or
other agents of a target company are charged with providing material
information to the acquirer as part of its due diligence. For a variety of
reasons those agents might have a strong interest in doing whatever they
can to ensure that the deal goes through, up to and including lying. It
seems plausible that there will be many situations in which the best way
for the parties to the acquisition to deal with the risk that agents will
make these kinds of misrepresentations is to have the acquirer agree to
let the target disclaim liability for any representations not set out in an
easily monitored format such as the final agreement and specified
appendixes or schedules. Rule 2 would allow parties to capture the
benefits of this arrangement. 129
3. Rule 2 only applies to an innocent principal, meaning a person
who has not behaved in a fraudulent or grossly negligent
manner by failing to prevent an agent's misrepresentation from
being made.
This rule reflects a conception of organizational culpability that may
not be universally shared. It also conflicts with the will theory.
However, it seems inevitable that some judges will take the view that
I8 In theory this second difficulty would be resolved if detrimental reliance always allowed
the principal to benefit from the change in position defense. However, I have not been able
to find a case in which a principal successfully relied on this defense. It is also important to
note that the judicial definition of a change in position may not capture all forms of
detrimental reliance. See Jonathan Dawe, The Change of Position Defence in Restitution, 52 U.
TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 275 (1994) (regarding the difficulty of accurately assessing a change
in position).
129 For a case with similar facts, see Grumman Allied Industries, Inc. v. Rohr Industries, Inc.
748 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1984).
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certain enterprises are too blameworthy to be allowed to hide behind a
contractual provision. This rule is also compatible with economic goals.
It is important to note the differences between the definition of an
innocent principal set out here and the definition of innocence contained
in the Restatement (Second) of Agency. First, this rule, unlike section 260
of the Restatement (Second) of Agency, does not presume that a partner
or a senior executive of a partnership or corporation represents the
enterprise for the purposes of determining its guilt or innocence. Most
theories of organizational culpability seem to require fault to be fairly
widespread before it inculpates an enterprise as opposed to just
individual agents. Second, although it is not explicitly stated above, an
enterprise should not be considered to be at fault simply because it
recognizes the risk that its agents will make misrepresentations and so
uses a contract to give its trading partner an incentive to monitor pre-
contractual misrepresentations.
These distinctions can be elucidated by referring to the facts of Bates
v. Southgate. The Restatement's approach to the determination of
innocence would support the conclusion that none of the partners of
Southgate Bros. were innocent, because the truly culpable partner would
be deemed to have spoken on behalf of the partnership. By contrast, a
court that adopted the approach suggested here would probably find
that the partners who did not make any misrepresentations were
innocent unless they knew or clearly should have known that their
partner was dishonest.
4. No person may rely upon a provision in a contract to prevent
another person from bringing any claim based on a
misrepresentation if that other person did not understand the
consequences of agreeing to the provision in question.
This rule is easy to defend in principle and is compatible with
virtually all theories of contractual obligation. The rule should apply to
virtually all low-value transactions involving consumers, meaning
individuals acquiring goods or services primarily for personal, family, or
household purposes. It also seems appropriate to apply the rule to cases
in which a person seems to have agreed to relieve another person of
liability for a material pre-contractual representation inadvertently or
because of the high costs of putting the representation in a legally
binding form. By contrast, this generally will not apply to transactions
involving large amounts of money and sophisticated commercial
enterprises--especially when the parties have been represented by
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counsel. Such enterprises should be presumed to be capable of making
sound decisions about whether they or their agents should agree to a
disclaimer. In fact, it may not be appropriate to ever apply this rule in
favor of a person who has been represented by an attorney. This is
because lawyers tend to read contracts carefully and advise their clients
of their meaning. It also seems reasonable to presume that they will
counsel their clients against investing inordinate amounts of trust in
representations that are not legally binding.
Cases involving individuals acting in a commercial capacity are on
the borderline. When they have been represented by an attorney, the
rule probably will not apply for the same reasons that it does not apply
to similarly represented consumers. In other cases, though, courts will
face a more difficult task. For example, there has been a fair amount of
litigation involving franchisees who have claimed that they were
induced to enter into franchising agreements by franchisors'
misrepresentations concerning expected profits.13° Cases go both ways
on the question of whether a contractual disclaimer can protect a
franchisor from such claims.131 There is a fairly widespread perception
that many franchisees are relatively unsophisticated, at least when
compared to franchisors, and it does seem reasonable to assume that
franchisees are prone to the same sort of cognitive illusions that induce
excessive trust in consumers contemplating large transactions. 132 On the
other hand, many franchisees are experienced business-people operating
multi-million dollar businesses.133 This suggests that in any given case
courts seeking to apply this fourth rule should examine the facts closely
and discard any stereotypical pre-conceptions about franchisees' ability
to protect themselves. 134
In determining whether or not to apply Rule 4 the courts should not
only examine the characteristics of the party against whom a disclaimer
130 See generally Kim Lambert, The Battle Against Claims of Presale Misrepresentations and
Allegations of Guaranteed Success, 11 FRANCHISE L. J. 95 (1992).
131 See, e.g., Slater v. KFC Corp., 621 F.2d 932 (8th Cir. 1980) (provision not enforceable under
Missouri law); Western Chance #2, Inc. v. KFC Corp., 734 F. Supp. 1529 (D. Ariz. 1990);
Rosenberg v. Pillsbury Co., 718 F. Supp. 1146 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding than an integration
clause is enforceable if it is clear and specific).
132 See, e.g., Gillian Hadfield, Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of Incomplete
Contracts, 42 STAN. L. REV. 927,960-65 (1990).
133 Michael Selz, Enterprise for Franchisees, Taking Control Can Be a Boon, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30,
1991 at BI; Michael J. McCarthy, When Franchises Become Rebellious-Outlet's Impact Grows on
Fate of Franchisers, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 1989 at B1.
134 People v. Kline, 110 Cal. App. 3d 587,595 (1980).
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is being asserted, but also the language of the disclaimer and the
conditions under which the parties' agreement was concluded. If the
language of the disclaimer is clear and specifically refers to the type of
misrepresentation alleged to have caused harm, then Rule 4 is unlikely to
apply. The situation is different, however, if the language is vague. In
that case the disclaimer should not be enforced if it seems likely that the
party against whom the disclaimer is being asserted did not understand
the consequences of entering into the agreement.
This view is definitely consistent with judicial practice. Many courts
have held that general, vaguely worded, merger clauses are "mere
boilerplate" that cannot bar claims based on a pre-contractual
misrepresentation; 3 5 others have held that only a "specific disclaimer of
reliance" can bar a claim of fraud. 36 The practical difficulty of course
lies in determining whether any given provision should be characterized
as vague boilerplate or a specific disclaimer of reliance. In carrying out
this task, judges' primary goal should be to protect the reasonable
expectations of the victim of the misrepresentation regarding the effect of
their agreement. However, it is also important for judges to consider the
interests of the party seeking to rely on the disclaimer. For instance,
other than in cases where a principal has reason to know that its agents
are prone to making particular types of misrepresentations, judges
should try to avoid placing too heavy a burden on principals to predict
the specific types of misrepresentations that their agents will make.
Insisting upon a high a degree of specificity could prevent many parties
from earning the potential gains associated with disclaimers of vicarious
liability for pre-contractual misrepresentations. This is because those
gains could be outweighed by the costs of drafting disclaimers that are
sufficiently detailed to meet the legal standard.
X. CONCLUSION
This article makes a number of contributions to both contract law
and agency law. Its stated purpose is to examine the ways in which
various theories of the basis of contractual obligation suggest courts
should resolve the conundrum of whether to enforce contractual
provisions that relieve one party of liability for fraudulent and grossly
negligent pre-contractual misrepresentations. When that party is a
135 Wohl v. Owen, 153 Misc. 2d 854,856 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1992).
136 La Bier v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 177 A.D.2d 767, 769 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1991); Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v. CES/Compu-Tech, Inc., 147 A.D.2d 396, 397-98
(N.Y. App. Div. 1989).
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natural person, the appropriate rule is admittedly debatable, but here I
have suggested that a rule of non-enforceability is appropriate. The
situation is somewhat clearer in cases where the party relying on the
disclaimer is an enterprise seeking to avoid the consequences of an
agent's misrepresentation. Then, contrary to the position taken by the
Restatement (Second) of Agency, and several courts, it seems
appropriate to enforce the disclaimer, except in cases involving
unsophisticated parties such as consumers and perhaps also in cases
where it seems right to blame the enterprise as a whole for the
misrepresentation.
One of the most remarkable features of the judicial decisions in this
area is how infrequently they acknowledge the fact that principles of
agency law might be applicable. Agency relationships are now so
pervasive in commercial life as to be almost invisible. However, an
important lesson to be drawn from the analysis in this article is that it is
critical to distinguish between the rules applicable to enterprises that act
through agents and those applicable to individuals who bargain face-to-
face. This is particularly important for contract law scholars, because
most rules of contract law are used to resolve disputes between
enterprises rather than individuals. 137 This article demonstrates the
significance of that insight.
137 Consider, for example, the problem of whether to enforce representations or warranties
given by a vendor under an agreement of purchase and sale where the purchaser is aware
at all material times that the warranty is not accurate. The preceding analysis suggests that
the law's response should depend upon whether or not the purchaser is an individual who
has personally obtained knowledge of the inaccuracy. It seems difficult to justify allowing
such an individual to recover more than nominal damages for breach of the warranty or
misrepresentation, even if the agreement says that the purchaser's remedies are not to be
affected by any investigations that she has made. However, the insights contained in this
article suggest that it may be less difficult to justify recovery if the purchaser is actually a
principal who did not have-and may not even be capable of having-any personal
knowledge, and the question is whether to artificially impute an agent's knowledge to that
principal.
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